膠東之戰為1932年9月至11月間發生於山東省東部之內戰，山東省政府主席韓復榘出兵攻擊駐紮於膠東的第二十一師師長劉珍年。目前學界鮮少論述該戰事之專著，相關記述，多為文史資料式的回憶性文章，或附屬於膠東之戰主角之一韓復榘的相關作品中，錯漏難免，且稍有不足。是以本文整理國史館庋藏之《蔣中正總統檔案》、《國民政府檔案》、《閻錫山檔案》，及相關人員的回隱、日記等史料，聚焦於此內戰，尤其扣緊是時國民政府軍事委員會委員長蔣中正對此地方事變的處置，期望對蔣之態度、決策，乃至於民國時期中央與地方之關係，做一補充。本研究指出，蔣中正在事發之初，對韓、劉無所偏倚，先求調查清楚，並有徵詢要員、加派情報人員、集中軍隊、安撫劉珍年等相應布置。此外，蔣派員製造輿論，期望以此壓迫韓復榘停止軍事行動。在戰況愈趨明朗之後，蔣對劉請其忍讓，對韓則軟硬兼施；一來請韓顧全大局，停止內戰，一來以軍委會名義嚴令停戰撤兵，靜待中央派員調查。9月底，韓復榘停戰，清勢似有轉圖，蔣處置方針趨向退讓，然韓以目標未達故無法接受中央方案，雖一度停戰，是後仍展閉更大規模之攻勢。蔣對調停膠東之戰，原有相當把握，但受限於內政、外交、剿匪等諸項事務，尤其正值國聯報告書發表，輿論要求一致對外，故無法強硬介入戰事，也無意武力解決，只得竭力忍受。於是在中央保證劉珍年部調走之前提下，韓復榘停戰徹兵。膠東之戰便以韓復榘得遂行其驅逐劉珍年、獨霸山束之目標告終。考察此戰，可知蔣非窮兵黷武之人，其運用手段（調停、輿論、分化等），考量亦廣，未迷信武力。此戰對蔣、韓關係及華北局勢，也有深遠影響，值得論者留意。

The Jiaodong War is a civil war taking place in east Shandong Province between September and November, 1932. The belligerents are Han Fuju (韓復), Chairman of the Shandong provincial government, and Liu Zhennian (劉榘), Commander of the 21(superscript st) Division. Few academic researches dealt with the the history of this war can be found today, therefore we may only refer to related memoirs and works on Han Fuju. Some clerical errors, therefore, are unavoidable. To understand more about the fact of the war, this article excerpted materials from the Academia Historica in Taipei, including Archives of President Chiang Kai-Shek (《蔣中正總統檔案》), Archives of Nationalist Government (《國民政府檔案》), and Archives of Yan Xishan (《閻錫山檔案》) Memoirs and diaries of figures related to this war are also consulted as supplements. In these materials, how Chiang Kai-Shek, the chairman of the National Military Council of the Nationalist Government at that time, coped with this event, is also narrated in detail to help us learning from Chiang's attitude toward this war; some archives even illustrate the relationship between the central and the local government during the Nationalist Government period.This article suggests that Chiang did not support either side of the belligerents at the beginning of the war; instead, he investigated the whole case before committing himself to this conflict. On one hand, Chiang tried to appease Liu Zhennian; on the other hand, he put pressure on Han Fuju with public opinions, trying to reach an agreement of a truce with belligerents. Meanwhile, Chiang even assembled the troops and asked important officials for advices.When the situation was much clear, Chiang changed his attitude toward the war; he tried to persuade Liu to make a concession and became tougher towards Han. In the name of National Military Council, Chiang ordered Han to cease fire and forced Han's army to retreat. Chiang was so confident about his ability to mediate the war that he ignored the conflict of interests behind. Han accepted Chiang's order ostensibly but later launched a comprehensive, broad-scaled attack. Limited by diplomacy, politics, and encirclement campaign against communist troops during the war, Chiang was attacked front and rear at this moment; he could not insist on his original order anymore and had to put up with the chaos caused by the war. Finally, after the Central Government agreed to transfer Liu out of east Shandong Province finally, Han promised to retreat and achieved his goal to occupy the whole territory.As we can see, Chiang was not totally believing in military forces; instead, he was manipulative and employed tricks whenever necessary. Instead of using military strength, which was obviously more powerful than Han's, Chiang chose to solve the problem by means of reconciliation and differentiation, and was also aware of using the pressure of public opinion to suspend the war.Recognizing Chiang's attitude toward the Jiaodong War, especially toward Han, helps us not only to know more about the political governance of Chiang, but also to understand the circumstances of North China.