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題名：技術授權，技術合作，策略聯盟與研究發展
作者：劉家銘
作者(外文)：Chia-Ming Liu
校院名稱：國立臺北大學
系所名稱：經濟學系
指導教授：顏平原
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2000
主題關鍵詞：技術授權；技術合作；研究發展
原始連結：連回原系統網址new window
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大部分的台灣廠商生產技術(如半導體廠商的製程技術)都是由國外廠商授權而得。因此進行有關專利權以及授權行為的探討，對於台灣產業及廠商行為的瞭解，是一個很重要的課題。特別是授權行為一方面將具有合作性，另一方面卻增加競爭性，兩相反力量的淨結果，在文獻上並沒有做詳盡的探討，本文將做此嘗試性的研究。另外，過去的文獻只在特定模型下，作出一些非一般性結果，本文不唯將授權行為作一般化分析，且建立一個一般化模型。
文獻上，正式分析專利權所有人可從授權行為中獲利的文章，可溯自Arrow (1962) 。在Arrow 之後，有關市場結構與專利權方面的文獻，主要有Usher (1964)、McGee (1966)、Demsetz (1969)及Kamien & Schwartz (1982)等等。本文主要結合Yi (1999)及Wang (1998)的模型架構，探討既是生產者又是授權者的現有技術優勢廠商最適授權行為及技術劣勢廠商內生組成研發聯盟的特點。
我們考慮在一寡占市場中，有三家廠商。其中一家廠商具有技術優勢，我們以邊際生產成本的差距來表示該優勢。技術劣勢的廠商可自行採取研發投資，期能製程創新，達成邊際生產成本下降。我們的方法是採用回溯演繹(backward induction)的方式，即由最後一階段所求得之最適解開始，依序代入前一階段，逐次往前尋找各個階段的均衡策略。因此，以下我們將先解第五階段的均衡解，然後再代入第四階段，以此類推。
我們的論點為：(1)若技術劣勢廠商均沒有研發成功，則在固定權利金下，技術優勢廠商將只會授權一家技術劣勢廠商，但在單位權利金下，技術優勢廠商將會授權二家技術劣勢廠商。(2)若技術優勢廠商可自由採取授權金制度時，則技術優勢廠商將會以單位權利金的方式，授權兩家廠商。(3)若只有一家技術劣勢廠商研發成功且技術優勢廠商可自由採取授權金制度時，則技術優勢廠商將會以固定權利金的方式，授權另一家失敗的技術劣勢廠商。(4)在技術優勢廠商的授權策略下，技術劣勢廠商將會組成聯合研發聯盟，而其在聯盟中所投入的研發量將會較沒有組成研發聯盟時為多；同時，第一家廠商的預期利潤將會比較少。(5)對技術優勢廠商而言，採事前授權的策略將可破解技術劣勢廠商組成研發聯盟；但在某些條件下，技術劣勢廠商將會拒絕事前授權；另外，若同時要事前授權全部的廠商，技術優勢廠商將會採用單位權利金的授權方式。
陳忠榮、林啟智 (1999) 市場結構、技術引進與技術生根 ＜經濟論文叢刊＞,new window
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