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題名：創業投資公司投資行為對被投資公司績效影響之研究
作者：劉松瑜
作者(外文)：Sung-yu Liu
校院名稱：國立政治大學
系所名稱：企業管理學系
指導教授：陳隆麒
林基煌
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2001
主題關鍵詞：創投；被投資公司；代理理論；技術；監控機制；激勵制度；逆選擇；Venture Capitalist；Venture-capital-backed firm；Agency Theory；Skill；Monitoring；Incentives；Adverse Selection
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雖然近年來的文獻已嘗試以有系統的方式，探討創投的參與投資，是否有助於提昇被投資公司的價值，然而這些實證研究卻鮮少剖析創投是透過何種途徑來影響被投資公司的價值。再者，此類研究往往從被投資公司上市、上櫃時的股票折價幅度，來探討創投的介入是否對於被投資公司的價值有所貢獻，不過卻較少針對被投資公司的長期經營績效和上市、上櫃後的股價績效進行分析，特別是有關創投對於被投資公司的經營績效影響之相關研究仍付之闕如。因此，本研究嘗試為相關研究另闢蹊徑，以期瞭解創投的參與投資是否確實為被投資公司帶來實質的貢獻。
首先，經由文獻探討和個案分析得知，將代理理論引用至本研究主題確實具有合理性。因此，本研究以代理理論的觀點，嘗試克服傳統「基本主理人──代理人的模式」之限制，並藉由Von Neumann-Morgenstern 效用函數而針對創投的介入對於被投資公司在經營績效和技術上的影響進行理論模式推導，故本研究的理論模式不僅強調技術的提昇為刺激高科技公司產出增加的原動力之外，同時亦考量監控機制和激勵制度彼此可能具互補性的特質。
本研究的各個研究假說分別演繹自理論模式結論或歸納自文獻探討暨個案分析。在實證研究方面，本研究將實證分為三個層次：第一層次係比較國內有創投參與投資的上市、上櫃公司和無創投參與投資的上市、上櫃公司，其在長期經營績效與短期股價表現上是否具有差異性。實證結果發現，有創投參與投資的公司，其在長期經營績效和短期股價表現上皆較無創投參與投資的公司來得差；不過，創投的介入確實承擔了被投資公司本身的部分風險。
實證的第二層次則在於檢視，創投是透過何種途徑來影響被投資公司的績效表現。實證結果顯示，主要創投的持股比例、參與被投資公司的創投家數、創投佔被投資公司的董監事席位比例、創投所承擔被投資公司的技術股股本佔總資本額的比例，或創投投資被投資公司的時點越早，皆對於被投資公司的長期經營績效表現有顯著的正面影響。
另外，創投佔被投資公司的董監事席位比例、創投所承擔被投資公司的技術股股本佔總資本額的比例、主要創投成立的年數越長，或創投參與被投資公司的時點越早，則對於被投資公司上市、上櫃後的短期股價表現有顯著的正面影響。
實證之第三層次，旨在探討創投的參與投資是否加速被投資公司上市、上櫃的時間。根據實證結果得知，有創投參與投資的公司，其從公司設立至上市、上櫃的時間確實較無創投參與投資的公司來得短，此意謂創投可加速被投資公司上市、上櫃的時間，使得被投資公司可以較早在資本市場上募得資金。
綜合上述實證結論，囿限於國內創投的籌資壓力和追逐聲譽的壓力，以及在「逆選擇」的前提之下，導致國內有創投參與投資的公司其績效表現較無創投參與投資的公司來得差。然而，本研究的實證結果並不否定創投的能力，換言之，本研究的實證結果肯定創投的專業能力和監控能力，同時亦肯定創投在國內產業升級上所扮演的重要角色。
Although recent work attempts to explore what venture capitalists do and whether venture capitalists'' involvement adds value for venture-capital-backed firms, it does not investigate the ways in which venture capitalists add value to their portfolio companies. Moreover, recent empirical research usually investigates whether venture capitalists'' involvement reduces underpricing when their portfolio firms going public, but it seldom explicitly examines the effect of the presence of venture capitalists on operating performance of venture-capital-backed firms. As a matter of fact, a number of issues relate to the relationship between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs have not been fully addressed. Therefore, the objective of this study is to fill both theoretical and empirical gaps.
This study applies agency theory which captures the essence between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs, and use Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function to analyze the effect of venture capitalists'' involvement on their portfolio firms'' operating performance and skills. Our theoretical model not only considers the importance of new technology in modern economies, but also includes the possibility that these two control mechanisms, monitoring and incentives, might be complementary.
Moreover, empirical results of this study reveal several important findings. First, we contrast venture-capital-backed firms with companies that have no venture-capital backing. Our empirical results indicate operating performance and after-market stock performance of firms with venture-capital backing are both inferior to that of firms without such backing, and the differences are statistically significant. However, venture-capital-backed firms seem to have lower levels of firm risk.
Secondly, empirical results provide evidence that the fraction of equity holdings of the lead venture capitalist, the number of venture capitalists, the number of the venture-capital-backed firm''s board seats held by venture capitalists, stock compensation system and the length of time that venture capitalists have invested are all positively associated with operating performance of venture-capital-backed firms.
In addition, the number of the venture-capital-backed firm''s board seats held by venture capitalists, stock compensation system, the age of the lead venture and the length of time that venture capitalists have invested are positively associated with after-market stock performance of firms with venture-capital backing. Not surprisingly, empirical results also provide evidence that venture-capital-backed firms go public earlier than non-venture-capital-backed firms.
Overall, the results of this study support the idea that venture capitalists do provide much more than financing to their portfolio firms. However, in a venture capital setting, adverse selection, grandstanding and money-recycling are important concerns; these concerns might explain why performance of venture-capital-backed firms are significantly inferior to that of non-venture-capital-backed firms. Indeed, our findings support the notion that venture capitalists'' investment behavior does influence performance of their portfolio firms in a number of ways due to their skills, expertise and monitoring abilities.
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