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題名:真理語意論與實在論
作者:林景銘
作者(外文):Ching-ming Lin
校院名稱:中國文化大學
系所名稱:哲學研究所
指導教授:林正弘
學位類別:博士
出版日期:2001
主題關鍵詞:真理實在論塔斯基類演算語言指謂理論真假條件TruthRealismTarskiLanguage of Calculus of ClassesTheory of ReferenceTruth Condition
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實在論的議題很廣,本文選取的是戴韋特(Michael Devitt)的傳統進路與達美特(Michael Dummett)的語言哲學進路的比較。本文先從實在論的兩個面向談起,實在論的獨立面向是關於有什麼項目客觀的獨立於心靈而存在;實在論的存在面向是關於有什麼項目存在的問題。
本文內容分為五章,第一章是介紹實在論議題的兩種進路,一種是戴韋特的進路,另一種是達美特的進路;然後論及真理理論與實在論的關係。第二章是討論塔斯基的真理理論,先從語意詭論(semantical paradox)開始,接著論述類演算語言與它的後設語言,介紹類演算語言的公理系統(axiomatical system);然後論述在類演算語言中真語句的定義,以及相關定理。這章的最後談到二階與二階以上的語言。
第三章討論三個主題:(1)塔斯基真理理論是否為真理符應論?(2)以及塔斯基理論是否需要補充一指謂理論?(3)比較達美特進路與戴韋特進路的異同。前兩個問題在第一章的第四節已經有所涉及,這兩問題通常是把塔斯基真理理論放在實在論的角度來看。第三個主題則是把實在論議題的兩個進路加以比較。
第四章是討論塔斯基真理理論與本論文各個主題的關聯。其中論題包括:由戴維森的觀點來檢討塔斯基真理理論是否是為真理符應論?補充一指謂理論之後,塔斯基真理理論是否更符合真理符應論的要求?此外,菲爾德與戴維森的不同立場也在這章中簡單的回顧。第五章則是簡短的結論。
In this dissertation we compare Michael Devitt's traditional approach and Michael Dummett's linguistic approach of realim. The topic in the beginning is two dimension of realim. In the existence dimension of realism we care about what entities exist; in the independence dimension we care about whether they exist independently of mind or not.
There are five chapters in the dissertation. First subject in chapter 1 is two approaches of realist issue: one is Devitt's approach, another is Dummett's approach. Second subject is that is there any connection between theories of truth and realism. In chapter 2 we discuss Tarski's theory of truth. The discussion start from semantical paradoxes; following subject tell about the language of calculus of classes and its metalanguage, also about axiomatical system for the language. Then we discuss definitions of true sentence and theorems in the language.
There are three subjects in chapter 3 : (1) Is Tarski's theory of truth a correspondence theory of truth? (2) Does Tarski's theory of truth need to be supplied a theory of reference? (3) Compare the Dummett's approach and the Devitt's approach. The first two subjects has been involved in section 4 of chapter 1, we often deal with these questions from the realist point of view. We compare two approaches of the issue of realism in the third subject.
The theme in chapter 4 is discussions of connections between Tarski's theory of truth and several subjects in this dissertation. One of discussions is from Davidson's point to discuss that is Tarski's theory of truth a correspondence theory of truth. After we supply a theory of reference to Tarski's theory of truth, is it more suitable for the request of the correspondence theory of truth? We also review different standpoints of Field and Davidson. Chapter 5 is a brief conclusion.
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