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題名:委託製造、設計契約與最適進出口品質政策
作者:沈采瑱
作者(外文):Shen, Tsai-chen
校院名稱:國立中正大學
系所名稱:國際經濟研究所
指導教授:陳芳岳
學位類別:博士
出版日期:2005
主題關鍵詞:委託製造代工委託設計代工最適進口品質管制最適出口品質管制original equipment manufacturingoriginal design manufacturingoptimal import quality controloptimal export quality control
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
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本文共分成三個研究主題,分別為「委託製造代工與委託設計代工下之最適研發政策」、「最適進口財品質政策」與「最適出口財品質政策」三部份。
第二章為「委託製造代工與委託設計代工下之最適研發政策」。我們利用一個含學習效果與研發行為的三期品質內生化模型,探討委託製造代工市場為獨占或完全競爭市場結構時,委託廠如何對委託製造代工/委託設計代工契約作選擇。我們進一步研究代工國研發補貼政策在其中能扮演的角色。我們發現不管最後一期OEM 代工市場是獨占或完全競爭,代工廠研發水準的高低皆會左右委託廠的選擇行為。我們證明當最後一期OEM 代工市場為獨占時,代工國政府介入契約的選擇並不能改善社會福祉;但是若最後一期OEM 代工市場為完全競爭時,在中等的學習效果參數下,代工國政府可以透過對研發補貼幫助代工廠在最後一期取得ODM訂單,並提昇代工國的社會福利。當代工廠商具有很強的學習能力時,代工國政府應放任廠商透過研發取得ODM訂單並提升社會福利。
第三章為「最適進口財品質政策」。我們利用品質內生化的雙占模型,分別在價格與數量競爭下,探討本國廠商生產高或低品質產品時的最適進口財品質政策。我們發現當本國廠商為高品質廠商時,在價格競爭中,本國對進口財實施最低品質要求可以提昇社會福利,但此品質下限政策會減少本國廠商的利潤。而在數量競爭中,本國則應禁止自由貿易,但如果無法禁止貿易,對進口財實施品質上限可以增加本國廠商的利潤與社會福利。若本國廠商為低品質廠商,在價格競爭中,本國則應實施進口財最低品質要求以提昇社會福利,而且此品質政策可以增加本國廠商的利潤。而在數量競爭中,本國則仍應對進口財實施最低品質要求以提昇社會福利,不過本國廠商的利潤會因此而下降。
第四章為「最適出口財品質政策」。本章探討國家間貿易財品質政策的制定順序與協商模式對其福利之意涵。我們證明出口國在品質政策制定上有先後之別時,在價格(數量)競爭中,優先國最適政策為設定出口財品質上(下)限,追隨國則以自由放任為最佳策略。我們也證明在價格競爭中,只有兩出口國協商下的最適政策是對高(低)品質出口財實施品質下(上)限政策;而在數量競爭中,出口國則皆應對出口財實行品質上限政策。在福利方面,在只有出口國協商的均衡中,相較於自由貿易不管是價格或數量競爭,高品質出口國的福利都會上升,但低品質出口國的福利則維持在自由貿易時的水準。而在進出口國可以共同協商時,只有在數量競爭時,高品質出口國的福利會提升,否則出口國的福利都與自由貿易時的水準相同,協商利得歸進口國所有。最後我們得證,在價格競爭時,進口國與全世界的福利在進出口國可以共同協商時的水準最高,而高品質出口國福利則在只有出口國參與協商時最高;而在數量競爭時,高低品質出口國的福利狀況與價格競爭類似,但是進口國及全世界的總福利則以政策制定有先後之別時的福利水準最高。
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