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題名:產品差異性與網路外部性的相關研究
作者:張瑞雲 引用關係
作者(外文):Ray-Yun Chang
校院名稱:國立東華大學
系所名稱:經濟學系
指導教授:郭平欣
學位類別:博士
出版日期:2006
主題關鍵詞:產品差異性網路外部性Network ExternalitiesProduct Differentiation
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
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博士論文共分為三個部分。第一部分是探討掌握關鍵要素的既存廠商,在面對一群偏好為異質性的消費者,以及提供要素給生產水平差異產品的下游競爭廠商時,是否會對下游競爭者採取市場封殺的議題。再者,為了避免產業的不公平競爭,我們更進一步從社會福利的觀點,分析政府是否應介入,將該既存廠商強制分割為上、下游獨立的兩家廠商的問題。我們得到的主要結論為:當市場為完全覆蓋時,既存廠商會對下游競爭者採取市場封殺的策略。另外,我們指出當產品價值夠高、生產成本夠低或偏離最偏好產品屬性之單位效用損失夠小時,政府應該強制既存廠商分割為上、下游獨立的兩家廠商,以達到社會福利最大。
第二部分主要是建構一個多階段的賽局模型來表徵防毒軟體產業的均衡。以垂直產品差異化及網路外部性的角度,分析防毒軟體廠商如何決定防禦率 (品質) 與價格,以及廠商的最適決策又將如何影響消費者的購買決策等問題。最後,我們還分析了市場結構變化對市場均衡以及對社會福利的影響。我們得到的主要結論為:由於網路外部性的關係,廠商會策略性地降低其軟體的防禦能力。當市場結構為獨佔時,廠商是否會提供其技術所能達到的最高防禦率,端視預期感染率的函數型式而定。若預期感染率為一個線性函數時,則獨佔廠商選擇最高防禦率;若預期感染率為一個凸函數時,則獨佔廠商會策略性地降低其防禦率。當市場結構為雙佔以及預期感染率為線性函數時,則同時選擇模型的高防禦率廠商選擇最高防禦率,但循序選擇模型的高防禦率廠商會策略性降低其防禦率。最後,我們還指出防毒軟體市場的社會福利水準與市場的獨佔力成反向關係。
第三部分是延續第二部分的雙佔模型,若消費者的預期決策在時間次序上早於廠商的價格決策,我們稱之為事前預期模型;若消費者的預期決策在時間次序上晚於廠商的價格決策,我們稱之為事後預期模型。此部分主要是探討預期形成時間對市場的競爭均衡與對社會福利有何影響。我們得到的主要結論為:不管品質的選擇是同時或者循序,事後預期模型的高防禦率廠商都選擇最高防禦率。相對於事前預期模型,不管是同時或者循序選擇品質,事後預期模型在品質與價格的差異都變大了,故兩家廠商的利潤也較大,但兩家廠商的均衡消費量卻因廠商價格提高而較少。最後,我們比較這兩種預期模型的社會福利大小,發現事後預期模型的社會福利小於事前預期模型的。
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