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題名：網路效果與廠商策略之三篇論文
作者：陳建成
作者(外文)：Chien-chen Chen
校院名稱：國立中正大學
系所名稱：國際經濟所
指導教授：陳和全
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2007
主題關鍵詞：相容性；產品差異性；軟體保護；軟體盜版；網路外部性；社會矛盾；庫諾競爭；Network Externality；Social delimma.；Cournot Competition；Software Piracy；Software Protection；Compatibility；Differentiated product
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隨著網路與電腦的普及化，產品相容性與防止盜版問題已成為現今兩個很重要的議題。而本論文針對這兩個議題加以深入探討，當市場上存在網路外部性之下，這兩個議題如何影響廠商的決策。在第二章中，我們同時考量產品差異性與產品相容性如何對廠商造成影響。而第三與第四章則是討論有關防止盜版的問題，第五章為總結。
有關相容性問題，第二章利用一個兩家廠商，兩階段的賽局模型進行分析。我們假設第一階段廠商先決定產品相容性，而第二階段則進行數量競爭。而在模型中，產品差異性為一個外生變數。透過這樣的設定，試圖去分析當市場存在網路外部性之下，廠商在產品相容性與差異性的最適選擇。我們發現廠商將產品相容性提高對自己越是不利，並且當產品相容性越高（越低）之下，廠商會試圖將產品差異化提高（降低）來減少損失。另外，本文發現在庫諾競爭之下，產品最小差異化原則不存在，而會出現產品最大差異化原則。最後在產品相容性為一個廠商可選擇的變數之下，會出現Social dilemma的狀況。
第三章與第四章是在探討當市場上存在網路外部性之下，軟體廠商採取軟體保護的選擇。同樣利用一個兩階段的賽局競爭進行分析，第一階段消費者決定是否採用或盜用軟體產品，而第二階段軟體廠商決定價格。在第三章中，我們討論軟體廠商對稱的保護策略，亦即兩家同時不採保護軟體與兩家均採保護軟體策略。我們發現在軟體廠商均不採保護之下，市場只存在第一類消費者全部購買使用與部分第二類消費者使用的均衡。而當兩家軟體廠商均採取保護策略之下，市場會存在兩組均衡，一組是第一類消費者全部使用而第二類消費者部分使用，另一組為兩類消費者均部分使用。最後，我們發現軟體廠商在不採取保護策略下的定價高於採保護策略。
而在第四章則接續第三章討論防止盜版的議題，此時兩家廠商採行不對稱保護策略，亦即一家採保護，另一家則不採保護。我們發現在不對稱保護策略之下，市場上存在的均衡組合與對稱之下均採保護的均衡組合相同，但均衡條件卻差異很大。我們發現當第一類消費者相對較多之下，採保護的軟體廠商可以定比較高的價格。另外透過軟體保護策略賽局分析，我們發現軟體廠商所提供的額外支援服務的效果是決定市場均衡的一個關鍵的因素。
The main concern of this thesis is to investigate firms’ strategies when the network effect exists in the market including two issues: the firm’s decision on the compatibility and anti-piracy problem. In chapter 2, we add in the existing literature with product differentiation to analyze its effect onto a firm’s decision about compatibility. Chapter 3 and 4 are dedicated to the issue of piracy problem.
In chapter 2, using a two-stage game model with two firms, we suppose that firms decide their degrees of product compatibility and then choose their outputs under Cournot competition. Through this setting, we explore the equilibrium choice of product compatibility and differentiation when network effect exists. We find that a firm with a higher degree of compatibility to other products has a more disadvantage in competition. We find that a firm with a higher (lower) compatibility to other firm is more likely to increase (decrease) degree of differentiation. The principle of minimum differentiation as in location literature does not exist under our Cournot model, but the principle of maximum differentiation exists. When considering compatibility as a choice variable, the social dilemma occurs and firms under Cournot equilibrium will choose the lowest degree of compatibility, but the social optimal occurs when both firms choose the highest degree of compatibility.
In chapter 3, we consider the piracy problem by using a duopoly price competition model for analyzing software firms’ strategy on law-protection. Moreover, the behavior of software users is also analyzed. We find that all type-1 and part of type-2 using software is the unique equilibrium when software is unprotected. When both software firms adopt protection strategy, an equilibrium where some type-2 consumers buy software exists. It exists two different kinds of demand pair depending on the size of extra-supporting provided by software firm. Finally, we find that the equilibrium price under none-protection is larger than under protection in the same equilibrium consumption group.
Chapter 4 follows the model in chapter 3 only with asymmetric law-protection strategies of the firms. Firms can differ in the choices of law protection strategy. By this study, whether to using law protection becomes a choice variable in the first stage, which is expected to change the competition of the firms. We also consider the software protection game in this chapter. In asymmetric strategies of software protection, equilibrium exists two cases: only part consumers of both types use software、all type-1 and part type-2 consumers use software. When firms adopt asymmetric strategies of software protection, the firm adopting software protection charges a higher price than the firm without protection policy facing more type-1. Through the software protection game, we know the extra-supporting service effect turns out to play a key factor to determine the market equilibrium.
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