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題名：股權結構對股利偏好和現金增資行為之影響-以中國上市公司為例
作者：林憶樺
作者(外文)：Yi-hua Lin
校院名稱：國立成功大學
系所名稱：會計學系碩博士班
指導教授：邱正仁
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2007
主題關鍵詞：配股認購權；現金增資；股權結構；國有股；股利偏好；State ownership；Ownership structure；Dividend preference；Seasoned offering equity；Rights offerings subscription
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中國大陸在近幾年以平均每年約9%的經濟成長率迅速成長，成為世界上成長最快速的新興資本市場。不過由於從以前的中央計畫經濟轉換到市場經濟，大多數上市公司是從國有企業改制而來。在這樣的背景下，使得股權高度集中以及高比例的國有股成為大陸上市公司股權結構的特徵。而國有股的比例高使得大多數股權控制在政府手中，也給予了對公司財務政策(如股利政策和現金增資等)的影響力，因此本論文探討中國大陸特殊的股權結構對其上市公司股利政策的選擇和現金增資的影響。
論文的第一個部分主要是探討中國大陸的股權結構和股利偏好的關係。 我們首先以中國大陸上市公司的樣本來檢測不同股權結構下和現金股利偏好之間的關係，然後進一步區分不同的成長機會的公司是否會有不一樣的結果。實證結果發現國有股愈高的公司愈會傾向發放現金股利，但在考慮公司成長機會下，只有在成長機會較低的公司，國有股比例和現金股利偏好成正向關係。而當員工持股比例和流通股比例愈高時，公司愈會傾向發放股票股利，為了進一步檢測結果的穩健，還額外測試不同的股利偏好和成長機會下，成長機會對資本支出敏感度的影響，結果仍然支持支持我們的假說。
論文的第二個部分是探討國有股對大股東在現金增資配股的認購行為以及現金增資後的經營績效的影響，首先檢測國有持股愈高時對大股東配股認購行為的影響，接著探討配股後的績效是否也如其他已發展國家如美國呈現衰退的現象，實證結果發現當國有股的比例愈高，大股東傾向放棄全部的配股權利。而當大股東放棄配股權利以及國有持股愈高時，配股後的ROE績效愈差，此外如以前研究相同，當配股前有盈餘管理操縱愈接近門檻的公司績效愈差。本論文不僅探討中國大陸特殊股權結構對股利偏好和現金增資中的配股行為的影響，對大陸股利偏好和配股行為提供更好的解釋因素，也對新興市場中有關大股東侵害小股東(La Porta et al., 2000; Claessens et al.,2000)的文獻有所貢獻。
Within a relatively short time, with an average annual economic growth of around 9 percent, China has become the largest and fastest-growing emerging economy in the world. Since moving away from the former centrally planned economy to market economy, most listed companies were transformed from SOEs. The resulting institutional transformation is characterized by the emergency of highly concentrated ownership and state-owned shares, which may exert influence on corporate finance. Majority control gives the state shareholder incentive to control over firms’ important financial policies, like dividend payouts and seasoned equity offerings. This thesis includes two studies on the impact of ownership structure on financial policies in China’s privatized firms.
The first article investigates the relation between ownership structure and dividend preference. We first examine the relation between ownership structure and cash dividend preference by using a large sample of China's privatized firms; we then reexamine the same relation in the case of firms with different levels of growth opportunities. We find that the positive relation between state ownership and cash dividend preference only in firms facing lower levels of investment opportunity. On the other hand, the higher the ratio of employee and tradable shares, the lower the cash dividend to total dividend. To validate this result, we additionally test the effect of dividend preference and ownership structure on capital investment and whether the sensitivity of capital investment to investment opportunities varies with cash dividend preference. The empirical evidence consistently supports our argument.
The second article examines state shareholders’ rights subscription behavior and post-RO performance in China. We investigate the effect of large shareholders on SEO rights offerings in China’s emerging market. In addition, we examine whether the post-RO underperformance documented in the United States and other developed markets also applies to a transition economy with central planning such as China. We find that with higher ratio of state-owned shares, large shareholders tend to give up all preemptive rights for new shares of stock. Likewise, evidence confirms a predicted positive relation between large shareholders’ full rights subscription behavior and post-RO operating performance. Firms with partial subscription by large shareholders tend to underperform than those with full subscription. Post-RO performance is worse for firms with ROE that are close to meet the critical value.
This thesis examine the impact of ownership structure on dividend preference and large shareholders’ rights offering subscription behavior and post-RO performance, which provides a fuller explanation of dividend preference and rights issuing behavior in China and has implications for transitional economies. We not only demonstrate the impact of ownership structure on financial policies, but we also contribute a growing body of research evidence corroborating the claim that concentrated ownership causes the expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling owners (La Porta et al., 2000; Claessens et al.,2000).
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