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題名:消費者對產品品質有錯誤認知下之市場福利與政策效果分析
作者:賴朝煌
作者(外文):Chao-Huang Lai
校院名稱:國立臺灣大學
系所名稱:農業經濟學研究所
指導教授:吳榮杰
學位類別:博士
出版日期:2007
主題關鍵詞:資訊不對稱錯誤認知社會福利分析食品品質Information AsymmetryMisperceptionSocial Welfare AnalysisFood Quality
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
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本文從買方和賣方訊息不對稱的觀點出發,建構一個市場供需決策模型,以數值模擬分析來討論當資訊不對稱且消費者對產品品質有錯誤認知的情況下,相較於完全訊息下的市場均衡,對產品價、量以及市場上供應商、消費者的決策行為與社會福利的影響。
研究結果顯示,在產品市場有消費者錯誤認知現象存在時,產品供應商可從中牟利,整體的社會福利下降,但辨識能力高的消費者可享有更高的消費者福利。此時,將品質不實產品下架的方法不能挽回產品品質,而強制將品質不實產品銷毀的政策亦不能有效杜絕不肖業者的欺騙行為。針對販售品質不實產品的行為,政府應對業者處以罰金,方能有效遏止業者利用消費者對產品認知不完全而從中牟利的動機。
Focusing on information asymmetry, a model comprising consumers’ and provider’s decisions was built to analyze the behaviors of consumers and provider. The impacts on social welfare were also analyzed when misperception exists on food quality and the abilities in distinguishing the quality are different within consumers.
The numerical simulations reveal that, food provider will cheat in food quality to make profits, the social welfare will be decreased and consumers with better quality distinguishing ability will enjoy positive welfare gains when misperception exists. In such situation, the best policy to prevent provider from cheating consumers is to impose fines on unfaithful conducts instead of eliminating or off-shelf passively.
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