This dissertation is a theoretical attempt to examine the role played by share-based schemes in an endogenous economic growth model. In Chapter 2 we set up an endogenous growth model with monopolistic competition in the goods market. Given an exogenously-determined worker share, we show that while a higher revenue-sharing ratio attributable to workers will promote employment, it will have an ambiguous effect on the balanced-growth rate. In addition, we investigate the optimal tax policy response to a revenue-sharing scheme and market imperfections, which are two market distortions.
In Chapter 3, the worker’s share is determined via the negotiation between a trade union and an employer federation. By shedding light on the role of revenue sharing and the bargaining institution, we successfully provide a theoretical explanation as to why unemployment can be quite compatible with high economic growth. In addition, in a share economy, unionization does not exhibit a monotonic relationship with growth. It also depends on the presence of revenue sharing and the bargaining institution.
To explain why firms themselves could be motivated to accept revenue sharing, we introduce the efficiency wage into our analytical framework and focus on the incentive effects of revenue sharing and their consequences on economic growth in Chapter 4. Specifically, our model comprises work effort and capital utilization. By virtue of the characteristics of modeling, we show that work effort can serve as an engine of economic growth. Of interest, we find that the balanced-growth rate is procyclical in relation to capital utilization, but it may be countercyclical in relation to work effort.