臺灣人文及社會科學引文索引資料庫系統

:::

詳目顯示

回上一頁
第 1 筆 / 總合 1 筆   第一頁 上一頁 下一頁 最後一頁
/1頁
題名：異質產品競爭下的研發、中間財封殺與補貼政策
作者：王文傑
作者(外文)：Wang Wen-Chieh
校院名稱：中國文化大學
系所名稱：經濟學研究所
指導教授：胡春田
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2008
主題關鍵詞：產品研發；製程研發；中間財封殺；異質產品；補貼政策；Product R&D；Process R&D；Foreclosure of Intermediate Good；Differentiated Product；Subsidy Policy
原始連結：連回原系統網址new window
相關次數：
  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(0) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:0
  • 共同引用共同引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:26
在探討廠商R&D行為的文獻中，有很多學者將研究重點集中在同質產品的製程R&D(Process R&D)上；但是，產品為同質的情形在實際上並不多見；而且根據Scherer & Ross (1990)的看法，美國的廠商中，有四分之三的R&D投入是用在產品R&D(Product R&D)上。近年來，台灣廠商的R&D支出逐年增加，而產品R&D的投入相較於製程R&D更能使廠商獲得競爭優勢，並減少競爭程度；因此，本論文之重點在於研究雙占市場結構，且產品為異質的情形下，廠商進行R&D決策行為之分析，內容包含政府的產業政策效果及廠商間R&D策略行為的互動分析。
論文共計三個單元，第一單元是異質產品研發競爭與補貼政策；第二單元是異質產品研發競爭、市場封殺與補貼政策；第三單元是異質產品廠商研發合作之策略行為。茲將本文的研究結論摘要分別說明如下：
在第一單元中，我們認為R&D補貼或技術移轉政策，將使得兩家廠商提升R&D水準，廠商即使獲得政府補貼或技術移轉，將無法成為產業領導者，亦即無法達到Brander (1995)所論述的策略性貿易政策的目標。至於出口補貼政策，如果是在產品R&D之後進行，此時政府視廠商既定的R&D水準再給予補貼時，由於這種補貼具有降低廠商邊際成本的性質，且無法再影響廠商的R&D水準，政策執行的結果使得本國廠商產量增加，外國廠商產量減少，因此與Spencer & Brander (1983)的結論一致。
第二單元，在廠商將中間財的決策納入考量後，補貼政策不必然使廠商提高R&D水準，必須視補貼內容來決定。而外國政府進行出口補貼時，在產品差異程度較小時，外國廠商反而減少R&D投入。本國政府對廠商進行中間財的補貼時，在產品差異程度較小時，本國廠商將減少R&D投入。最後，政府對廠商進行R&D補貼時，將使廠商增加R&D投入；而廠商增加R&D投入均使得外國中間財價格下降。此觀點與Banerjee & Lin (2003)的看法不同，他們認為增加R&D投入的目的在於使對手廠商的成本相對提高。
在第三單元，廠商對於R&D採取合作或競爭的策略，也受到產品差異程度的影響；在產品差異程度較大時，產品市場的競爭程度降低，廠商進行R&D合作的均衡R&D投入將增加。在異質產品的假設下且廠商僅進行製程R&D時，其結論與d’Aspremont & Jacqumin (1988)接近。但是對照兩位學者的看法，在R&D合作與R&D競爭在均衡R&D投入的比較上，廠商是否進行R&D合作也要將產品差異程度列入考量。最後，當產品R&D投入也影響廠商生產成本的時候，廠商在決定是否進行R&D合作時，除了顧及R&D外溢程度及產品差異程度之外，對於其產品R&D投入影響生產成本的因素也要一併考量；當其受影響程度較大時，將削弱廠商進行R&D合作的意願。
In studying firms’ R&D behaviors, many researchers concentrate on the homogeneity products' process R&D. In fact, it is very unusual to see products’ homogeneity in real world. According to Scherer & Ross (1990), among the American firms, 3/4 of them spent their R&D expenses on product R&D. In recent years, Taiwanese firms have increased their R&D expenditures. Firms gain more advantages on product R&D than process R&D where also helps to reduce competition. The focal points of this thesis lie in studying the oligopoly market structure, and analyzing the behaviors of firms’ R&D decision making under the situation of product differentiated. The contents include the impacts of government industrial policies and the analyses of R&D decision behaviors among firms. There are three sections in the thesis.
Section 1 described the policies of R&D and export subsidies under competition of differentiated products. Section 2 described the competition among differentiated products’ R&D, market foreclosure, and subsidy policies. Section 3 described the strategic interactions of R&D cooperation under differentiated products. Below are the brief conclusions of this thesis.
In the first section, because of the subsidy on R&D or technology transfer policies which promote the level of R&D for both firms, the firms will not be able to be the leader of the industry even if they obtain the government subsidy or technology transfer. In other words, they will not be able to reach the Strategic Trade Policy goals that Brander (1995) specified. As far as the policy on export subsidy, if it is processed after the product R&D and the government subsidies firms on their output level, because the subsidy lowers the marginal cost of the firms and cannot impact on the R&D levels, the results of the policies will be the output increase on domestic firms while decreasing on foreign firms' output. The results correspond to Spencer & Brander (1983).
In the second section, after taking the decision of firms’ intermediate goods into consideration, the subsidy policy won’t necessarily increase firms’ R&D level. If foreign government subsidy their export product and there is small product differentiation, foreign firm will decrease the R&D input. If the government subsidy intermediate good from their domestic firm and there are small product differentiation, the domestic firm will decrease their R&D input. Finally, if the government applies R&D subsidy for the firm, the firm will increase the R&D input, which in turn will lower the price of intermediate good from foreign firm. This finding is different from what Banerjee & Lin (2003) found. They claimed that the purposes of increasing R&D input were to increase the cost of competitive firm.
In the third section, we discussed that the R&D strategies of cooperation or competition taken by firms based on the differentiated products. When the product differentiation is large, the product competition of the market is release and the equilibrium cooperation of R&D input among firms will increase. If the product is heterogeneous and firms only conduct process R&D, our conclusion corresponded to d’Aspremont & Jacqumin (1988). Also, the product differentiation has to be considered when we discussed R&D cooperation among firms. When the product R&D input impacts on production cost and the firms consider R&D cooperation, other than the factors of R&D level and product differentiation, the factors of product cost influenced by the product R&D input also needed to be considered. If the impacts were large, the willingness of R&D cooperation among firms would be crippled.
郭平欣、張瑞雲 (2006)，「關鍵要素獨占廠商的垂直分割與產業公平競爭的福利分析」，《公平交易季刊》，14(2)，39-70。new window
Banerjee, S. and P. Lin (2001), “Downstream R&D, Raising Rivals’ Costs, and Input Price Contract,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 21 (1), 79-96.new window
Bowley, A. L. (1924), The Mathematical Groundwork of Economics, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Brander, J. A. and B. J. Spencer (1985), “Export Subsidies and International Market Share Rivalry,” Journal of International Economics, 18, 83-100.
Brander, J. A., (1995), “Strategic Trade Policy,” National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper, 5020.
Brod, A. and R. Shivakumar (1997), “R&D Cooperation and the Joint Exploitation of R&D,” The Canadian Journal of Economics, 30(3), 673-684.
Chiang, A. C. (1984), Fundamental Methods of Mathematical Economics, 3rd ed., McGraw-Hill, 546-547.
Clark, D. J. and C. W. Armstrong (2006), “Product and Process Innovation in a Differentiated Goods,” Economics and Management Working Paper.
d’Aspremont, C. and A. Jacquemin (1988), “Cooperative and noncooperative R&D in duopoly with spillovers,” American Economic Review, 78, 1133-1137.
De Bondt, R. and R.Veugelers (1991), “Strategic investment with spillovers,” European Journal of Political Economy, 7, 345-366.
De Bondt, R. Slaets, P. and B. Cassiman (1992), “The degree of spillovers and the number of rivals for maximum effective R &D,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 10, 35-54.
Dixit, A. and J. E. Stiglitz (1977), “Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity,” American Economic Review, 67, 297-308.
Dixit, A. (1979), “A model of duopoly suggesting a theory of entry barriers,” Bell Journal of Economics, 10, 20-32.
Eaton, J. and G. M.Grossman (1986), “Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy under Oligopoly,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101, 383-406.
Erkal, N. (2005), “Optimal Licensing Policy in Differentiated Industries,” Economic Record, 81(252), 51-60.
Foros, Ø. (2004), “Strategic investments with spillovers, vertical integration and foreclosure in the broadband access market,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 22(1), 1-24.new window
Gupta, S. and R. Loulou (1988), “Process Innovation, Product Differentiation, and Channel Structure: Strategic Incentives in a Duopoly,” Marketing Science, 17(4), 301-316.
Katz, M. L. (1987), “The Welfare Effects of Third-Degree Price Discrimination in intermediate Goods Markets,” American Economic Review, 77, 154-187.
Klepper, S. (1996), “Entry, exit growth and innovation over the product life cycle,” American Economic Review, 86, 562-583.
Levin, R. C. and P. C. Reiss (1988), “Cost-Reducing and Demand-Creating R&D with Spillovers,” Rand Journal of Economics, 19(4), 538-556.
Lin, P. and K. Saggi (2002), “Product differentiation, Process R&D, and the nature of market competition,” European Economic Review, 46, 201-211.
Lin, P. and K. Saggi (2004),"Optimal Ownership Structure and Technological Upgrading in Joint Ventures," Review of Development Economics, 8(2), 279-294.
Melitz, M. J. (2003), “The Impact of Trade on intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate Industry Productivity,” Econometrica, 71(6), 1695-1725.
Mukherjee, A. and N. Balasubramanian (1999), “Technology transfer in a horizontal differentiated product market,” ECIS Working Papers 99.4.
Qiu, L. D. and Z. Tao (1998), “Policy on international R&D cooperation: subsidy or tax?,” European Economic Review, 42. 1727-1750.
Rosenkranz, S. (2003), “Simultaneous choice of process and product innovation when consumers have a preference of product variety,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 50 183-201.
Rubinfeld, D. J. and H. J. Singer (2001), “Vertical foreclosure in Broadband Access,” The Journal of Industrial Economics, 49(3), 299-318,
Salop, S. C. and D. T. Scheffman (1983), “Raising Rivals Costs,” American Economic Review, 73, 267-271.
Salop, S. C. and D. T. Scheffman (1987), “Cost-Raising Strategies,” The Journal of Industrial Economics, 36(1), 19-34.new window
Scherer, F. M. and D. Ross (1990), “Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance,” Houghton Mifflin, Boston, MA.
Silbey, D. S. and D. L. Weisman (1998), “Raising rivals’ costs: The entry of an upstream monopolist into downstream markets,” Information Economics and Policy, 10, 451-470.
Singh, N. and X. Vives (1984), “Price and quantity competition in a differentiated duopoly,” Rand Journal of Economics, 15, 546-554.
Spencer, B. J. and J. A. Brander (1983), “International R&D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy,” Review of Economic Studies, 50, 702-722.
Spencer, B. J. and R.W. Jones (1991), “Vertical Foreclosure and International Trade Policy,” Review of Economics Studies, 58, 153-170.
Suzumura, K. (1992), “Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in an Oligopoly with Spillovers,” American Economic Review, 82, 1307-20.
Symeonidis, G.. (2003), “Comparing Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in a differentiated duopoly with product R&D.,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 21. 39-55.
Utterback, J. M. and W. J. Abernathy (1975), “A Dynamic Model of Process and Product Innovation,” OMEGA, 3(6), 639-656.
Weisman, D. L. and J. Kang (2001), “Incentives for Discrimination when Upstream Monopolists Participate in Downstream Markets,” Journal of Regulatory Economics, 20(2), 125-139.
 
 
 
 
第一頁 上一頁 下一頁 最後一頁 top
QR Code
QRCODE

臺灣人文及社會科學引文索引資料庫

目前上線人數：1017（臺灣：1017，外國：0） ／ 本年度總使用人次：2541260 ／ 訪客人次（自102年09月）：68338452
國家圖書館著作權聲明 Copyright © 2013 All rights reserved.
本館地址: 100201臺北市中山南路20號． 本館地圖及交通資訊．
總機：(02)23619132．最佳瀏覽解析度為1024x768以上