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題名：有關貿易、產業與區域經濟之三篇論文集
作者：林晏如
作者(外文)：Yen-Lu Lin
校院名稱：淡江大學
系所名稱：產業經濟學系博士班
指導教授：梁文榮
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2009
主題關鍵詞：空間差別取價；空間聚集；服務全市場條件；最適貿易政策；Cournot競爭；產品異質(水平異質)；產品標準化政策；二維空間模型；Spatial Discriminatory；Spatial Agglomeration；Market-Serving Condition；Optimal Trade Policy；Cournot Competition；Horizontal Differentiation；Product Standard Policy；Two-Dimension Spatial Model
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第一篇論文為「產品異質、空間差別訂價與空間聚集」。De Fraja and Norman (1993)發現當廠商在線性都市市場採行空間差別訂價時，廠商的均衡區位皆為聚集在市場之中點，且此一解為模型之「惟一解」。本文採用一個較 De Fraja and Norman (1993) 合理的服務全市場條件(market-serving condition)，重新檢視該文之均衡。本文發現若廠商採取空間差別訂價時，廠商之區位均衡可能是聚集解也可能是分離解，視運輸費率與產品異質程度而定。若給定產品之異質程度，則當運費費率較低時，廠商之最適區位為一聚集解；但當運輸費率提高到某一程度後，廠商之最適區位會向兩端移動而產生分離解，且此一分離之傾向會隨著產品異質程度降低而提高。
第二篇論文為「最適貿易政策、Cournot競爭與水平異質」，本文採用Hotelling的不完全覆蓋市場空間模型，假設產品的水平異質特性由廠商內生決定，建立一個三國二廠商的三階段貿易模型，探討廠商從事 Cournot 數量競爭下本國政府的最適單向出口政策。本文發現當產品的異質程度內生決定時，提高出口稅會創造一個水平異質效果，透過擴大產品之水平異質程度以降低競爭，進而提高價格與利潤水準，本國政府的最適單向出口政策為課徵出口稅，此結果與Eaton and Grossman (1986) 有很大的不同。再者，本文証明若短期內產品的異質程度來不及調整，則水平異質效果消失為零，本國政府的最適單向出口政策仍為出口補貼。此外，本文也發現當本國與外國廠商在第三國市場各自為區域獨占廠商時，本國政府的最適單向出口政策為自由貿易 (free trade)，與傳統非空間 (spaceless) 模型中的獨占廠商最適出口政策結論相同。
第三篇論文為「產品標準化政策與貿易保護-二維空間模型之應用」，本文採用二維的空間模型，考慮水平異質特性的產品標準化政策，探討當廠商在市場從事出廠價格競爭時本國政府的最適產品標準化政策。本文發現隨著單位轉換成本愈高，本國政府的最適產品標準愈趨近於本國廠商的標準。尤其是當單位轉換成本為零時，本國政府的最適產品標準為市場之中點；當單位轉換成本大(等)於一時，本國政府的最適產品標準為本國產品標準。當單位轉換成本小於一時，標準化政策不必然會提高本國廠商之利潤，須視單位轉換成本
The essay is composed of three independent papers. The first paper is “Product Differentiation, Spatial Price Discrimination and Spatial Agglomeration”. De Fraja and Norman (1993) conclude that the two firms necessarily agglomerate at the market center, which is the unique locational equilibrium under spatially discriminatory pricing. Our paper challenges their definition of the market-serving assumption for being too restrictive and proposes a more reasonable one. Using the modified definition, this paper finds that the location configuration can be of either central agglomeration or dispersion under spatially discriminatory pricing, depending on the magnitude of the transport rate and the degree of product differentiation.
The secondary paper is “Optimal Trade Policy, Cournot Competition and Horizontal Differentiation”. Introducing an uncovered market of the Hotelling’s linear city model, this paper constructs a three-country, two-firm trade model with a three-stage game to explore the unilateral optimal export policy under Cournot competition, as the degree of horizontal differentiation is endogenously determined. This paper shows that a rise in the export tax creates a horizontal-differentiation effect to mitigate competition via enlarging the degree of horizontal differentiation. This leads to the results that the optimal export policy of the domestic country is to levy a tax policy.
The third paper is “Product Standardization Policy and Trade Protection- An Application of the Two-Dimensional Spatial Model”. This paper constructs a two-country, two-firm trade model to explore the optimal product standardization policy under Bertrand competition when products exhibit features of horizontal and vertical product differentiation. It shows that the optimal standard is 1/2 when the unit switch cost is zero, while equals the standard of the domestic firm when the unit switch cost is larger than one. It also shows that given the unit switch cost being smaller than one, the standardization policy does not protect domestic firm when the upper bound of consumers’ quality taste is small, while it does when the upper bound is large. Moreover, this paper proves that a rise in the quality difference between two products may lead to the result that the effect of the standardization policy from not protection to protection, when the upper bound lies in the intermediate range, say, 1.13 1.3.This gives an incentive for the government to impose an industrial policy for enlarging the magnitude of the quality difference.
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