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題名:清潔發展機制與經濟成長的二個議題
作者:陳建元
作者(外文):Chien-Yuan Chen
校院名稱:逢甲大學
系所名稱:經濟學所
指導教授:王葳
學位類別:博士
出版日期:2010
主題關鍵詞:社會福利長期成長率京都議定書清潔發展機制附件ㄧ污染防治非附件ㄧ內生成長理論Kyoto ProtocolAnnex Inon-Annex Isocial welfarepollution abatementthe long-run growth rateClean Development Mechanismendogenous growth theory
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近年來,環境污染與溫室氣體 (greenhouse gases, GHG) 累積的情況日益嚴重,也逐漸受到國際間的重視。其中溫室氣體的增加被視為造成氣候變遷的元兇,而氣候變遷的長期趨勢除造成乾旱、暴雨、熱浪等現象日益頻繁之外,更嚴重地威脅人類與其他生物的生存。聯合國氣候變化綱要公約 (The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, UNFCCC) 與京都議定書 (The Kyoto Protocol) 的簽署表現出了國際社會間共同保護氣候系統、防止人類行為破壞的決心。京都議定書中所規範的清潔發展機制 (The Clean Development Mechanism, CDM) 提供了各國相互合作以達成溫室氣體排放減量的平台,透過該機制的參與,非附件一國家可改善自然環境以達成永續發展的目標,同時亦可對公約保護氣候系統的目標作出貢獻;而附件一國家則可以低成本的方式達成其排放減量承諾 (emission reduction commitments)。
由於研究方法的缺乏,長久以來經濟學家認為環境保護與經濟成長的目標無法同時達成,直到近年來內生成長理論 (endogenous growth theory) 與各種描繪自然環境的論述蓬勃發展之後,始提供了經濟學家更合適的工具與基石來探討環境保護與經濟成長的相關議題。內生成長理論適合於探討各種經濟成長的現象,而清潔發展機制則有助於國家達成環境保護與永續發展,因此本論文結合二者,建構包含內生成長理論、清潔發展機制、污染防治與政府公共支出的模型,討論家計部門的最適選擇與政府政策對經濟體系的影響。
於論文的第二章,我們詳細地介紹了聯合國氣候變化綱要公約與京都議定書的發展,並說明清潔發展機制執行的情況與各個附件一國家所需承擔的排放減量承諾。之後討論附件一國家參與清潔發展機制的選擇,我們發現若以社會福利的觀點衡量,在資本對污染影響力較小的情況下,清潔發展機制參與率的增加才可能造成社會福利的增加。換言之,參與清潔發展機制對附件一國家而言不全然有利。
第三章著重於探討非附件一國家對參與清潔發展機制的最適選擇,有別於第二章,本章模型考慮了政府的生產性支出對於家計部門產出的影響。結論顯示若以追求高長期成長率和社會福利的觀點衡量,唯有在自然資本對產出的影響力與資本對污染影響力較大的情況下,清潔發展機制參與率的增加才可能提高長期成長率與社會福利。此外,結論也指出於較貧窮的附件一國家中,其自然資本對產出的影響力較大,同時也傾向接受雙邊模式的清潔發展機制 (bilateral CDM)。
第四章則總結全文,做出政策建議並提出可供未來研究發展的相關議題。
In recent decades, the environmental problem is serious and the situation of the increasing atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHG) is concerned by nations. It is believed commonly that the increase of GHG emission is the source of the climate changes. The long-term changes in the climates bring huge effects on the human being and other creatures, the changes including droughts, heavy precipitation, heat wave, and other extreme weather. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol were adopted by nations for preventing the climate system from the dangerous effect of mankind activity. The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is one of the international cooperating mechanisms to assist the non-Annex I parties in achieving sustainable development and in contributing to the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC, and to assist the Annex I parties in performing compliance with their reduction commitments.
For a long time, the economists deemed that the objectives of environmental protection and economic growth could not be achieved simultaneously. The development of the endogenous growth theory and the new concepts of describing the environment provided the economists useful foundation for researching this issue further. The endogenous growth theory is a useful instrument for researching the economic growth, and the CDM is a suitable mechanism for accomplishing the environmental protection and sustainable development. In this thesis, we combine the endogenous growth theory with the CDM to construct a simple model including the CDM, pollution abatement, and the government’s public expenditure to discus the optimal choice of the household and the impact of the government’s policy on the economy.
In Chapter 2, we introduce the developments of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol completely, and present the data of the CDM and Annex I parties’ emission reduction commitment clearly. Beside, the choice of the Annex I party for joining in the CDM projects is discussed. We find that an increase in CDM-involved rate may make social welfare increasing, when the effect of capital on pollution is smaller in the economy. In other words, the Annex I party may obtain advantage or not from joining in the projects.
In Chapter 3, we focus on the government’s optimal choice for the CDM projects in the non-Annex I party. In this model, we consider the effect of the government’s productive expenditure on the production function, which is ignored roughly in Chapter 2. The results of the model represent that non-Annex I party should accept more CDM projects to seek the higher long-run growth rate and social welfare, if the natural capital stock’s share of production function and the effect of capital on pollution are large enough. The results also indicate that the effect of the natural capital stock on production function is larger in the poorer non-Annex I party, which may prefer the bilateral CDM projects.
In Chapter 4, we summarize this thesis, and mention the extended issues of this objective for the further researching.
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