臺灣人文及社會科學引文索引資料庫系統

:::

詳目顯示

回上一頁
第 1 筆 / 總合 1 筆   第一頁 上一頁 下一頁 最後一頁
/1頁
題名：貿易援助與外人直接投資之經濟分析
作者：劉瀚榆
作者(外文)：Liu, Hanyu
校院名稱：國立中正大學
系所名稱：國際經濟研究所
指導教授：陳芳岳
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2011
主題關鍵詞：貿易援助；援助矛盾；Barbell model；FDI；AFT；paradox of aid；Barbell model；FDI
原始連結：連回原系統網址new window
相關次數：
  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(0) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:0
  • 共同引用共同引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:20
本論文是由三篇文章所組成。第二章主要探討貿易援助(Aid for Trade, AFT)在貿易便捷化過程中所產生的經濟效果，包含援助矛盾(paradox of aid)發生的條件與策略性貿易下，兩國貿易政策的相關性。其主要結論為：1.當援助國相對市場規模較大較容易產生援助矛盾的現象。2.在貿易政策的相關性上，貿易援助無助於貿易自由化的推動。反之，貿易自由化則有助於貿易援助的推展。第三章主要以Hwang and Mai (1990)之Barbell model為架構，探討品質訊息不完全下，獨占廠商如何透區位選擇向消費者傳達品質訊息，以及由此所產生的市場進入模式。其主要結論為：當市場進入模式為出口，低品質廠商選擇在本國設廠；當市場進入模式為FDI，低品質廠商選擇在外國市場設廠。廠商的市場進入模式取決於FDI的固定成本大小。高品質廠商基於傳訊的理由，無論在出口模式或FDI模式，與完全訊息相比其最適區位會往國界靠近。此外，對高品質廠商而言，完全訊息下的出口模式在不完全訊息下會因為廠商的傳訊動機而改採FDI模式。第四章探討獨占廠商如何利用價格和外人投資區位向消費者傳遞產品品質的訊息和最適關稅的問題。我們得到唯一的分離均衡，高(低)品質廠商選擇高(低)生產成本的國家從事外人投資；高(低)品質產品的價格大(等)於完全訊息下的價格；進口國對來自低生產成本國家產品的最適關稅與完全訊息下相同，但對來自高生產成本國家產品的最適關稅則為角解。高、低品質產品的關稅大小需視成本與品質相對差異化程度而定。最後，我們也得證，在某些條件下完全訊息下的社會福利高於不完全訊息下的社會福利。
This thesis is composed of three articles. In Chapter 2, we investigate economic effects of Aid for Trade (AFT) in the process of trade facilitation, including the condition when a paradox of aid occurs and the relevance of strategic trade policy of countries in trade. The main results are as follow. (1) If a donor country has a larger home market, the paradox of aid is more likely to occur. (2) An AFT helps to enhance trade liberalization. However, the trade liberalization does not help to promote the AFT. In Chapter 3, we adopt a framework of “Barbell model” proposed by Hwang and Mai (1991) and discuss how a monopoly firm can signal the quality of products to consumers through location choice and through entry modes. The entry mode for the low quality firm depends on the fixed cost of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). A low quality firm in the incomplete information regime chooses the location to set up its factory as that in the full information regime. Regardless of entry modes, the high quality firm chooses a location near the border to signal itself under incomplete information. In addition, a high quality firm, choosing the export mode in the case of full information, will switch to the FDI mode in the case of incomplete information. In Chapter 4, we study how a monopoly firm can signal the quality of product by the price and location of FDI. We also examine the optimal tariff of the importing country. We obtain a unique separating equilibrium, in which the high (low) quality firm chooses the country with high (low) production cost as a production base. The price of high (low) quality in incomplete information is higher than (as the same as) that in the full information. The tariff of products from countries of low production costs is the same as that in the full information. The optimal tariff of products from the high production cost country is a suboptimal corner solution. The optimal tariff of both high and low quality depends on the relative differentiation of cost and quality. Finally, we demonstrate the social welfare in the full information is higher than in the incomplete information.
參考文獻

Abe Kenzo and Yasuhiro Takayama (2005) , “Tied Aid and Welfare ,”Review of International Economics, 13
(5), 964-972.
Alberto. N. and Pierfranceso , R. (2007) , “Foreign Market Entry Strategies Under Asymmetric
Information,” Review of International Economics, 15 (4), 758-781.
Alper C.E and Mumcu A. (2007), “Interaction between Price, Quality and Country of Origin When
Estimating Automobile Demand: The Case of Turkey,” Applied Economics, 39, 1789-1796.
Bagwell, K. and R. W. Staiger (1989), “The Role of Export Subsidies When Product Quality Is Unknown,”
Journal of International Economics , 27, 69–89.
Bagwell, K. (1991), “Optimal Export Policy for A New-Product Monopoly,” American Economic Review, 81,
1156–69.
Bagwell, K. and M. H. Riordan (1991) , “High and Declining Prices Signal Product Quality,” American
Economics Review, 81, 224-239.
Bagwell, K. and R. W. Staiger (2003), “Informational Aspects of Foreign Direct Investment and The
Multinational Firms,” Japan and the World Economy, 15, 1-20.
Bhagwati, J. , R. Brecher and T. Hatta (1983) , “The Generalized Theory of Transfers and
Welfare :Bilateral Transfers in a Multilateral World, “American Economic Review, 83, 606-618.
Bhagwati, J., R Brecher and T. Hatta (1985) , “The Generalized Theory of Transfer and Welfare:
Exogenous (policy-imposed) and Endogenous(transfer-induced)Distortions, ” Quarterly Journal of
Economics , 100, 697-714.
Brainard, L. and D. Martimort (1997), “Strategic Trade Policy with Incompletely Informed Policymakers,”
Journal of International Economics, 42, 33–65.
Brander, J.A., Krugman P (1983) , “A 'Reciprocal Dumping' Model of International Trade,” Journal of
International Economics,15, 313-321.
Brander, J. and B. Spencer (1984), “Trade Warfare: Tariffs and Cartels,” Journal of International
Economics, 16, 227-242.
Cho, I-K and D. M. Kreps (1987), “Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria,” Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 102, 179-221.
Collie, D., and M. Hviid. (1993), “Export Subsidies As A signal of Competitiveness,” Scandinavian
Journal of Economics, 95, 327–339.
Dei, F. (1990) , “A Note on Multinational Corporations in a Model of Reciprocal Dumping, ” Journal of
International Economics, 29, 161-171.
Gross, J. and Holahan, W. (2003), “Credible Collusion in Spatially Separated Markets,” International
Economic Review, 44, 299-312.
Grossman, G. and H. Horn (1988), “Infant-industry Protection Reconsidered: The Case of Informational
Barriers to Entry,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 103, 767–87.
Haucap, J., C. Wey, and J. Barmbold (1997), “Location Choice as A Signal for Product Quality: The
Economics of Made in Germany,” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 153, 510-531.
Haucap, J., C. Wey, and J. Barmbold (2000), “Location Costs, Product Quality and Implicit Franchise
Contracts,” Journal of International Economics, 52, 69-87.
Hertzendorf, M. N. (1990) , “A Model of Signaling Product Quality,” Working Paper No. 216, Department
of Economics , University of Rochester.
Hertzendorf, M. N. (1993) , “I’m Not a High-Quality Firm-but I Play One on TV,” Rand Journal of
Economics, 24, 236-247.
Horstman, I. and G. MacDonald (1994) , “When Is Advertising a Signal of Product Quality?” Journal of
Economics and Management Strategy, 3, 561-584.
Hwang, H. and Mai,C. (1990) , “Effect of Spatial Price Discrimination on Output, Welfare, and
Location,” American Economic Review, 80, 567-575.
Hwang, H. and Mai,C. (2002) , “The Tariff-Jumping Argument and Location Theory ,” Review of
International Economics, 10, 361-371.
Hwang, H. and C-C Mai (1991), “Optimum discriminatory Tariffs under Oligopolistic Competition,”
Canadian Journal of Economics, 24, 693-702.
Johnson, Alison, and Matthew Martin (2005) , “Empowering Developing Countries to Lead the Aid
Partnership, ” Human Development Report, United Nations Development Program.
Johansson, J. K. and I. D. Nebenzhl (1986), “Multinational Expansion: Effect on Brand Evaluations,”
Journal of International Business Studies, 17, 101-126.
Jones, Ronald (1970) , “The transfer problem revisited, ” Economic, 37, 178-84.
Katayama, K. and K. Miyagiwa (2009), “FDI as A Signal of Quality,” Economics Letter, 103, 127-130.
Kemp, M. C. and Kojima, S. (1985) , “ Tied Aid and The Paradoxes of Donor-Enrichment and Recipient-
Impoverishment, ” International Economic Review, 26, 721-729.
Keynes, J. M (1929) , “The German Transfer Problem,” Economic Journal, 39, 1-7.
Lahiri, S. and Raimondos-Møller, P. (1997) , “ On the Tying Aid to Tariff Reform, ” Journal of
Development Economics, 54, 479-491.
Leontief, Wassily (1936) , “Note on the pure theory of capital transfer,” in explorations in
economics”: Notes and essays contributed in honor of F. W. Taussing, New York: McGraw Hill.

Liang, W., Hwang, H., and Mai, C. (2006) , “Spatial Discrimination: Bertrand vs. Cournot with
Asymmetric Demands,” Regional Science and Urban Economics, 36, 790-802.
Lutz, N. A. (1989) , “Warranties and Signals under Consumer Moral Hazard,” Rand Journal of Economics,
20, 239-255.
Mayer, W. (1984), “The Infant-Export Industry Argument,” Canadian Journal of Economics, 17, 249–269.
Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts (1986) , “Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality,” Journal of
Political economy, 94,796-821.
Mukherjee, A. and U. Broll (2007), “Welfare effects of foreign direct investment: cost saving vs.
signaling,” Journal of Economics, 90, 29-43.
Nebenzahl, I. D. and Jaffe, E. D. (1993), “Estimating Demand Functions from The Country-of-Origin
Effect,” Chapter 6 in Nicolas Papadopoulos and Louise A. Heslop, (Eds.), Product-Country Images:
Impact and Role in International Marketing. The Haworth Press, New York, 159-178.
Nelson, P. (1970) , “Information and Consumer Behavior,” Journal of Political Economy , 78, 311-329.
Nelson, P. (1974) , “Advertising as Information,” Journal of Political Economy 84, 729-754.
Ohyama, Michihiro (1974) , “Tariffs and The Transfer Problem ,”Keio Economics Studies 11,29-45.
Overgaard, P. B. (1993) , “Price as a Signal of Quality-A Discussion of Equilibrium Concept in
Signaling Games,” European Journal of Political Economy, 9, 483-504.
Overgaard, P. B. (1994) , “Equilibrium Effects of Potential Entry When Price Signal Quality,” European
Economics Review, 38, 367-383.
Peng and Hwang (2008) , “Antidumping Policy, Price-Undertaking and FDI, ” Taiwan Economic Review,
36:4 , 463-481.
Ramey, G. (1987) , “Product Quality Signaling and Market Performance,” IMSSS Technical Report No. 504,
Stanford University.
Samuelson, P. A. (1947) , Foundations of Economic Analysis, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Samuelson, P. A. (1952) , “The Transfer Problem and Transport Costs,: The Terms of Trade When
Impediments Are Absent, ” Economic Journal, 62, 278-304.
Samuelson, P. A. (1954) , “The Transfer Problem and Transport Costs, Ⅱ:Analysis of Effects of Trade
Impediments,” Economic Journal, 64, 264-89.
Schooler, R. D. (1965), “Product Bias in The Central American Common Market,” Journal of Marketing
Research, 2, 394-397.
Shy, O. (2000), “Exporting as A Signal for Product Quality,” Economica, 67, 79-90.
Vettas, N. (1999) , “Location as a Signal of Quality, ” CEPR Discussion Paper, No. 2165.
Wright, D. (1998), “Strategic Trade Policy and Signaling with Unobservable Costs,” Review of
International Economics, 6, 105-119.


 
 
 
 
第一頁 上一頁 下一頁 最後一頁 top
QR Code
QRCODE

臺灣人文及社會科學引文索引資料庫

目前上線人數：1026（臺灣：1025，外國：1） ／ 本年度總使用人次：2042760 ／ 訪客人次（自102年09月）：67841460
國家圖書館著作權聲明 Copyright © 2013 All rights reserved.
本館地址: 100201臺北市中山南路20號． 本館地圖及交通資訊．
總機：(02)23619132．最佳瀏覽解析度為1024x768以上