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題名：廠商組合銷售行為之經濟分析
作者：鍾暳陵 引用關係
作者(外文)：Hui-Ling Chung
校院名稱：國立東華大學
系所名稱：經濟學系
指導教授：林燕淑
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2011
主題關鍵詞：組合銷售；品牌內差異程度；品牌間差異程度；研發；垂直產品差異；福利分析；Bundling；Intra-brand Differentiation；Inter-brand Differentiation；Innovation；Vertical Product Differentiaion；Welfare Analysis
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此論文由三篇與組合銷售議題相關之文章組合而成，以產業經濟理論模型為分析之基礎。三篇皆假設市場上存在兩家廠商及產品1、2兩類型產品，產品1僅由某一廠商生產，產品2同時由兩家廠商生產，即兩廠商兩類型產品模型。第二章為 「組合產品行為與產品差異程度」。我們一般認為，品牌內差異程度愈高或品牌間差異程度愈低，廠商將愈有誘因採行組合銷售策略。為了證明此觀點之正確性，我們採用一般化需求函數分析產品差異程度如何影響組合銷售行為。本章發現，在Bertrand 與 Cournot 競爭下，品牌內差異程度並非影響廠商採行組合銷售策略之主因，而品牌間差異程度愈低確實可使廠商愈有誘因採行組合銷售策略。此結果與Venkatesh與Kamakura (2003) 一文得到當生產成本較低或消費者保留價格較高時，產品差異程度愈高，廠商愈有誘因採行組合銷售的結果不同。此外，Bertrand競爭下，組合銷售必定使消費者剩餘下降，但對手廠商利潤及社會福利可能提高；而Cournot競爭下，組合銷售一定使對手廠商利潤與社會福利下降，但可能提高消費者剩餘。
　　第三章之題目為 「進口競爭、廠商組合銷售與研發」，此篇分析當廠商進行Bertrand或Cournot競爭時，外國廠商的組合銷售行為對產業研發、本國廠商利潤、消費者剩餘以及社會福利的影響。假定產品1僅由外國 (組合銷售) 廠商生產，產品2則同時由本國與外國廠商生產，此二產品互為獨立品且兩廠商針對產品2進行研發競爭，本文發現在Bertrand 競爭下，外國廠商之組合銷售行為將使外國廠商的研發水準下降、本國廠商之研發水準增加，此一結果與 Choi (2004) 顯著不同；而在 Cournot 競爭時，兩廠商的研發水準皆下降。此外，不論廠商間競爭的方式為何，組合銷售會使本國廠商利潤上升以及市場總研發水準、本國消費者剩餘及社會福利皆下降。
第四章研究 「組合銷售，研發與品質差異程度」，本篇建構垂直產品差異化模型，分析當廠商研發效率存在不對稱，產品品質及研發效率之差異程度如何影響廠商的組合銷售行為，並進一步分析組合銷售行為對產業研發、對手廠商利潤、消費者剩餘以及社會福利的影響。假設產品1、2兩類型產品互為獨立品且兩廠商針對產品2進行研發競爭。本章發現，不論組合銷售廠商為高品質或低品質廠商，當低品質水準非常高且組合銷售廠商之研發效率低時，隨著產品品質差異程度降低，組合銷售可能成為廠商之劣勢策略。此結果與一般直覺有所不同。反之，品質差異程度降低或研發技術差異程度增加，組合銷售將為廠商的優勢策略。此時，組合銷售皆使對手廠商的利潤下降，而社會福利可能提升。當組合銷售廠商為高品質廠商時，此時組合銷售行為將使市場總研發水準增加、消費者剩餘必定提升。
The dissertation consists of three papers with bundling issue that applies a theory model of industrial economics. All of them set both a two-firm, two-product model in which product 1 (the monopoly product) is produced only by the bundling firm and product 2 (the competing product) is produced by both firms. Chapter 2 is “Bundling Behavior and Product Differentiation”. In general, the incentive to bundle product increases with a higher degree of intra-brand differentiation and a lower degree of inter-brand differentiation. In order to better explain the puzzling market phenomena, this paper sets up the gerenal demand functions, in order to discuss the effects of degrees of differentiation between competing products as well as bundled products on the bundling decision, and hence the opponent’s profits, consumer surplus, and social welfare. The analysis shows that under both Bertrand and Cournot competitions the incentive to bundle does not necessarily increase with the degree of intra-brand differentiation, while it strictly decreases with the degree of inter-brand differentiation. Our result is different from that in Venkatesh and Kamakura (2003) which pointed an increase in value added or a increase in the degree of product differentiation increases the incentive to bundle. Moreover, under Bertrand competition bundling always decreases consumer surplus but may increase the competitor’s profit and social surplus. Under Cournot competition bundling always reduces the opponent’s profit, and social welfare, but may increase consumer surplus.
　　The title of the chapter 3 is “Import Competition, Firm’s Bundling and Innovation”. This paper sets up a duopoly model with one domestic firm and one foreign firm to analyze the effects of a bundling behavior by the foreign firm on the innovation and profit of the domestic firm, consumer surplus, and social welfare under Bertrand or Cournot competition. There are two products in the model in which product 1 is produced only by the foreign firm and product 2 is produced by both firms. Assuming that the two goods are independent in demand and the two firms engage in innovation only for product 2, we find that the bundling practice decreases the foreign firm’s innovation, but increases the domestic firm’s innovation under Bertrand competition. However, it decreases both firms’ innovation. Moreover, the bundling practice always increases the domestic firm’s profits and innovation of the industry, and reduces the domestic consumer surplus and welfare.
The chapter 4 is “Bundling, Innovation and Quality Differentiation”. This paper studies the effects of degrees of quality differentiation as well as innovation efficiency differentiation on the bundling decision in a setting where the competing products are vertically differentiated. This paper further discusses the effects of bundling behavior on the opponent firm, consumer, and social surpluses. Assuming that the two goods are independent in demand and the two firms engage in innovation only for product 2, we show that whether the bundling firm is a high-quality provider or not, bundling is a dominanted strategy equilibrium with the decrease in the degree of quality differentiation when the low quality level is enough high and bundling firm has low innovation efficiency differentiation. The result is different from general intuition. On the other hand, bundling is a dominant strategy equilibrium with the decrease in the degree of quality differentiation or the increase in the degree of innovation efficiency differentiation. Moreover, bundling always reduces the opponent’s profit, but may increase social welfare. When the bundling firm is a high-quality provider, the bundling practice always increases the innovation of the industry and decreases consumer surplus.
中文參考文獻
廖俊雄、許心怡 (2003)，「寡占電信市場行銷組合訂價策略之研究」，公平交易季刊，11:2，pp.111-148。
廖俊雄、許心怡 (2004)，「Stackelberg 競爭下行銷組合定價策略之福利分析」，經濟研究，40:1，pp.97-129。

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