本研究為解決綠色能源企業的代理問題，以World Bank(1999)公司治理架構為基礎，在內部機制方面，主要專注於股權結構及董事會結構，而在外部機制方面則專注於會計師的監督角色與資訊透明度的規範機制。旨在探討公司的信用風險不同時，公司治理的監督效果，對於綠色能源企業與供應商及顧客連結效能的影響。
藉由實證結果，發現不同的內部與外部治理機制具有不同的監督效果，會藉由降低代理問題，而影響綠色能源企業在供應鏈中的經營效能。本研究亦發現，企業信用風險確實會干擾公司治理的效果。信用風險越低時，若公司治理越好，則原物料週轉率、應收帳款週轉率及市場佔有率越高。此外，當綠色能源企業的信用風險低於4時，若公司治理越好，則供應商會提供較長的進貨付款天數的優惠條件，可使公司的資金運用更具效能。本研究認為綠色能源公司在強化公司治理機制之際，更須設法降低企業信用風險。二者的交互效果有利於提高公司在供應鏈中與上下游企業的連結效能。

This research focuses primarily on the shareholding structure and board structure in the internal mechanism; it also explores the auditor’s monitoring role and information transparency regulation mechanism in the external mechanism based on the corporate governance structure of the World Bank (1999). In order to solve the agency problems of green energy companies, this paper examines the influence of the corporate governance monitoring effect on the linking effectiveness of green energy companies with suppliers and customers when corporate credit risks differ.
According to the empirical results, this research found that different internal and external governance mechanisms have different monitoring effects that will reduce agency problems and affect the operating effectiveness of green energy companies in the supply chain. Credit risks interfere with the corporate governance effect. In lower credit risk companies, if the corporate governance is better, the raw material turnover, accounts receivable turnover, and market share rates are higher. In addition, when the credit risk of a green energy company is low (TCRI<4), if the corporate governance is better, the supplier is willing to provide favorable payment conditions so that the company has more effective capital utilization. This research suggests that green energy companies not only strengthen the corporate governance mechanism, but also attempt to reduce corporate credit risks. The interactive effects of both facilitate the improvement of linking effectiveness with upstream and downstream companies in the supply chain.