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題名：道德客觀主義的一種辯護
作者：林素純
作者(外文)：Lin, Su-Chun
校院名稱：國立中正大學
系所名稱：哲學研究所
指導教授：許漢
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2015
主題關鍵詞：道德實在論；道德實踐性；理由；動機；品德；道德外在論；道德內在論；moral realism；moral practicality；reason；motivation；virtue；moral externalism；moral internalism
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本論文試圖為道德客觀主義的實踐面向辯護－一種局部的辯護。這個辯護的途徑是透過提供一個可供選擇的，屬於道德客觀主義，處理與道德之規範特性相關問題的方案來進行。如果這個方案是成功的，它將可以作為道德客觀主義處理道德之實踐性問題的一個可能選項－說明客觀的道德判斷與主體的行為之間如何可能有可靠的連結。
道德是規範的，其規範的有效性表現在人們會因為某項行為是道德所要求的而去做那項行為。然而對於任何一個自由且能夠做選擇及決定的行為主體來說，不必然會因為某項行為是道德所要求的就去做那項行為。因此，從一項行為是道德所要求的，到一個人會因為那是道德要求的行為而去做它，這之間的連結，有待一個合理的說明。而本論文意圖提供一個這樣的說明方案。本論文提供的方案包含三種立場：道德實在論（R）、道德外在論（E），以及以經驗研究為基礎的品德理論（V）。所以將此方案簡稱為REV方案。
REV方案是一個自然主義的方案。是自然主義的，呈現在兩個地方。一個是，方案中用來說明道德之規範力來源的道德事實，是自然事實，可以用他人是真實的存在這一事實來涵蓋。他人是真實的存在這個事實是由自然事實所構成的，而且可以由一組非固定的自然事實（包含心理的、生物的、精神的、認知的）所實現。他人是真實的存在，能感受痛苦與快樂、有追求幸福的需要，這些事實使得我們有理由遵守道德要求。另一個是，方案中用來說明一個人之道德信念或覺察與其動機能有穩定連結的條件－品德，是一個可以用經驗心理學來說明的概念。根據Snow（2010）的品德理論－一個以經驗研究為基礎的品德理論，品德，基於CAPS（認知情感的處理系統）特性的方法，是特殊的動機、認知及情感要素緊緊綁在一起的一捆東西，在這捆東西中，認知及情感成分受到有品德特徵的動機所形塑及指引。
另外，REV方案也是一個道德外在論的實踐方案。它是道德外在論的，呈現在以下這個主張：在情境C，一個人判斷做y可以讓是道德上對的事得以實現，此人不必然會因此而有做y的動機，而且，即使她沒有做y的動機，她也不是不理性的。道德判斷與動機之間的連結，需要別的東西來說明。在REV方案中，這個說明道德判斷與動機之連結的東西是：品德。當一個人相信行為y在道德上是獲得證成的，也就是在道德上有理由做y，假如此人是一個有品德的人，她將可靠的有想做y的動機；或者說，如果她是一個有品德的人，她將會可靠的把既存的理由（規範理由）當成其行為的理由（此時她的動機理由與規範理由是一致的）。
 
In this thesis, I attempt a defense of moral objectivism with a special focus on the problem of practicality. In virtue of its focus on moral practicality, this defense is a kind of local defense, as opposed to a global defense. The approach in my defense is to lay out an objectivist practicality project to which is capable of dealing with various problems related to moral normativity which is central to any adequate theory of morality. If this project works, the moral objectivists who would agree to the project I propose here would be well-equipped to meet challenges which raise problems from moral practicality - to explain how it is possible that moral judgments reliably connect to agent's actions.
Morality is essentially normative. Its normative effect manifests on people who will characteristically follow moral requirements. But it is simply a fact that people as free agents capable of autonomous decisions are not motivated necessarily by moral requirements to act morally. Therefore, it is required that an adequate inquiry of morality have to explain as plausibly as it can the connection between moral requirements and agent′s actions. This dissertation proposes a project which explains how a moral objectivist can address the practicality problem. The project proposed by this dissertation is constituted by three positions: a certain version of moral realism (R), a certain version of moral externalism (E), and an empirical-research-based theory of virtue (V). So I called this project REV.
A core character of REV is that it is a naturalistic account. It is naturalistic in two respects. The first respect is that moral facts are natural facts. We can cover moral facts by facts about others are real being. Essentially, moral facts are facts of other people which in turn are identified by a set of indefinite natural facts, such as their psychological states, biological features, mental capabilities, cognitive states. Other people are real beings: they can feel pains and pleasures, they are motivated to pursue happiness, and so on. These give rise to moral concerns and in this way these fact are to ground morality. The second respect of this naturalism is, as I shall claim, that virtue is a key to explain how it is possible that an agent’s moral judgments can reliably connect to her motivations. In the REV project, I attempt an empirical-research-based conception for virtue adopted from Nancy Snow (2010) according to whom virtues, modeled on CAPS (cognitive-affective processing system), are tightly integrated bundles of distinctive motivations, cognitions, and affective elements, in which the cognitive and affective components are shaped and directed by motivations which are characteristic of virtue.
In addition, a moral externalistic account figures in REV. A moral externalistic view is this: when someone judges that she ought to do y in circumstance C, in that doing y can make what is morally right realized, she may not be motivated to do y at the same time, and she is not irrational. The connection between moral judgments and motivations needs to be explained by some other factor. REV proposes that this factor is virtue. If someone beliefs that it is morally justified to do y, and if she is a virtuous person, she will reliably be motivated to do y.
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中文參考書目
吳瑞媛，2015。〈理由轉向：規範性之哲學研究－導論〉，《理由轉向：規範性之哲學研究》謝世民主編（2015），第1頁至第73頁。
許漢，2015。〈道德規範、道德實踐與行為主體：經驗主義與道德規範性〉，《理由轉向：規範性之哲學研究》謝世民主編（2015），第255頁至第284頁。

網路參考資料
Bagnoli, Carla (2011). ”Constructivism in Metaethics”, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. （http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/constructivism-metaethics/）
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter (2011a). “Moral Skepticism”, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism-moral/)

 
 
 
 
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