臺灣人文及社會科學引文索引資料庫系統

:::

詳目顯示

回上一頁
第 1 筆 / 總合 1 筆   第一頁 上一頁 下一頁 最後一頁
/1頁
題名：代工、國際技術授權與製程研發的經濟分析
作者：曹古駒 引用關係
作者(外文)：Ku-Chu Tsao
校院名稱：國立東華大學
系所名稱：經濟學系
指導教授：林燕淑
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2018
主題關鍵詞：代工談判力；福利分析；國際代工；貿易政策；消費者剩餘；不對稱廠商；成本差異；製程研發；國際技術授權；垂直相關市場；Consumer surplus；Welfare analysis；Cost difference；Bargaining power；Subcontracting；Trade policy；Vertically related market；R&D；License
原始連結：連回原系統網址new window
相關次數：
  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(0) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:0
  • 共同引用共同引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:0
此論文由三篇文章組合而成，分別針對代工、國際技術授權以及製程研發的政府政策以及對社會福利影響的研究。全文皆以部分均衡理論(partial equilibrium theory)為分析之基礎，並根據各章的賽局模型，以倒推方式(backward induction)逐步求解子賽局完全均衡(sub-game perfect equilibrium)。
第二章為「代工談判力與最適代工出口政策」。我們設立一個簡單的三國模型，本國與外國皆可生產中間財與最終財，並都出口最終財至第三國做Bertrand競爭。其中，本國廠商在中間財市場具有成本優勢，故可以為外國廠商的中間財生產代工。本章利用兩國廠商代工時因成本差異所創造出的剩餘分配比例作為議價力大小，討論本國政府的中間財最適貿易政策與議價力之間的關係。在本章中，我們發現在本國議價力夠大(小)時，代工後最終財均衡價格會大(小)於代工前的價格；若本國議價力為中間值時，則代工後本國最終財均衡價格會大於代工前的價格，但外國最終財均衡價格會小於代工前的價格。然而，一般認為政府對中間財課徵出口稅可以改善其利潤攫取效果，但是我們發現在具有議價力的代工模式下，上述的情況唯有在本國廠商議價力不夠大時才會發生，而在本國廠商議價力夠大時，本國政府的最適中間財出口政策卻是異於傳統的為出口補貼。我們也證明了出口稅外生時，本國議價力對本國廠商利潤的影響必為正相關；出口稅內生化時，若出口稅效果為負且夠大時，則本國議價力對本國廠商利潤的影響為負相關。最後，我們也得到在外國廠商存在其他代工廠商選擇下，當代工廠商議價力夠大時，本國政府的最適政策不會受到威脅；當代工廠商議價力夠小時，本國政府的最適政策因為受其他代工廠商選擇的威脅，此時議價力愈大，稅率反而會愈高。以及，即使本國廠商的總成本較高，但仍有可能繼續代工。
第三章題目是「多層次國際技術授權的福利分析」。本章節建立一個本國上、下游垂直相關市場模型，討論多層次國際技術授權對本國福利的影響。我們考慮四種引進國外技術授權的政策：(一)只引進上游技術政策、(二)只引進下游技術政策、(三)同時引進上、下游技術政策、以及(四)自由放任。本章發現：第一，只引進上游技術政策的消費者剩餘和產業利潤會大於只引進下游技術政策的消費者剩餘和產業利潤。第二，如果授權技術為低(高)端技術，則只引進上游技術政策的消費者剩餘大(小)於同時引進上、下游技術政策的消費者剩餘。第三，在社會福利方面，只引進上游技術政策的社會福利會大於同時引進上、下游技術政策的社會福利，但自由放任政策下則最好。這些結果說明在垂直相關市場下，本國存在較多的國際技術授權不見得本國的福利會增加。在此多層次國際技術授權模型中，雙重邊際化程度與社會福利可能呈現正向關係。本章也討論在同時引進上下游技術政策時有先後順序以及這些新進技術為國內技術的情形。
第四章研究「市場結構與製程研發」。產業經濟的文獻在討論市場結構對廠商研發誘因的影響時，大多假設市場上所有廠商皆做研發，本章假設市場上有些廠商具有研發能力，但有些廠商則無，藉以探討市場結構對程序創新(process innovation)的影響。本章發現，當研發廠商家數增加，個別研發廠商的研發投資水準會下降，但是當不做研發的廠商家數增加時，若研發廠商的生產邊際成本夠大(小)，則個別的研發投資水準會下降(上升)。另外，在福利分析中，我們發現政府開放有做研發的廠商進入市場未必能提高福利；在某些條件下，政府開放未做研發的廠商進入市場反而會增加福利。
This dissertation is composed of three articles, subcontracting, licensing, and process R&D. We examine the effects of those on government policies and social welfare. Partial equilibrium approach, sub-game perfect equilibrium, and backward induction are all applied throughout the three topics.
Chapter 2 is entitled "Subcontracting bargaining power and the trade policy". In this chapter, we consider that the split of surplus from a subcontracting deal depends on the relative bargaining powers of domestic and foreign firms. This shows that a domestic optimal export policy is a tax (subsidy) if the bargaining power of the domestic firm is sufficiently small (large). We also demonstrate that a domestic firm’s higher bargaining power increases (may decrease) domestic profit if the export policy is exogenous (endogenous). In the presence of an outsider option, the domestic optimal export policy will be threatened by the outsider option if the domestic firm’s bargaining power is sufficiently small, and thus a large bargaining power increases the optimal export tax. At the same time, the foreign firm may still subcontract to the domestic firm even if the domestic firm has a higher total marginal cost of the intermediate good than the outsider option.
Chapter 3 is entitled "On the welfare analysis of two-tier international technology licensing". This paper analyzes the impact of two-tier international technology licensing on industry profit, consumer surplus, and domestic welfare. We examine four international technology licensing regimes for the domestic government: Upstream licensing only (UL), downstream licensing only (DL), both upstream and downstream licensing (UDL), and no policy with licensing (NPL). We show that both consumer surplus and industry profits are higher under UL regime than those under DL regime. The consumer surplus is higher (lower) under UL regime than that under UDL regime when innovation size is small (large). NPL regime has the highest social welfare, UL regime has the higher social welfare than UDL regime. These results reflect that, in a two-tier licensing framework, welfare is not always better off when the domestic country allows to import more international licensing. In addition, it is shown that the results still hold in two extended discussions: A leader-follower game under UDL regime and domestic licensors.
Chapter 4 is entitled "Market structure and process R&D". In literature, while discussing the impact of market structure on firms’ R&D incentives, it is common to assume all firms invest R&D. However, on the evidence of real word, some firms do not. This chapter sets a model where a group of firms do R&D and the other group does not, and finds that when the number of R&D firms increases, the R&D investment level will decline, on the contrary, when the number of non-R&D firms increases, if the R&D firms’ production marginal costs are large enough (small), then the R&D investment level decreases (increases). On the welfare analysis, it is shown that an increase in the number of R&D firms may not be socially desirable, whereas an increase in the number of non-R&D firms may be socially desirable.
陳芳岳，洪進朝 (1997)“國際間委託代工下之最適貿易政策,”人文及社會科學集刊，9，31-44.
王光正，邱俊榮 (2004)“垂直相關市場與最適出口貿易政策,”經濟論文， 32, 362-391.
吳世傑，陳宏易 (2014)“代工貿易與出口政策,”經濟論文叢刊，42, 333-361.
Arya, A. and B. Mittendorf (2006) “Enhancing vertical efficiency through horizontal licensing,” Journal of Regulatory Economics, 29, 333-342.
Arya, A., B. Mittendorf, and D. Sappington (2008) “Outsourcing, vertical integration, and price vs. quantity competition,”International Journal of Industrial Organization, 26, 1-16.
Aghion, P., N. Bloom, R. Griffth, and P. Howitt (2005) “Competition and innovation: An inverted-U relationship,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120, 701-728.
Arrow, K. (1962) “Economic welfare and the allocation of resources for inventions,” in R. Nelson (ed.), The Rate and Direction of Economic Activity, Princeton University Press, N.Y.
Bagchi, A. and A. Mukherjee (2014) “Technology licensing in a differentiated oligopoly,” International Review of Economics and Finance, 29, 455-465.
Bakaouka, E., and Milliou, C. (2018) “Vertical licensing, input pricing, and entry.” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 59, 66-96.
Belleflamme, P. and C. Vergari (2011) “Incentives to innovative in oligopolies,” The Manchester School, 79, 6-28.
Brander, J. A., and B. J. Spencer (1985) “Export subsidies and international market share rivalry,” Journal of International Economics, 18, 83-100.
Cao, J. and A. Mukherjee (2017) “Market power of the input supplier, technology transfer and consumer welfare,” The Manchester School, 85, 430-449.
Cellini, R. and L. Lambertini (2011) “R&D incentives under Bertrand competition: a differential game,” The Japanese Economic Review, 62, 387- 400.
Chang, R. Y., H. Hwang and C. H. Peng (2013) “Technology licensing, R&D and welfare,” Economics Letters 118, 396–99.
Chang, M. C., J. L. Hu and C. H. Lin (2013) “The optimal licensing strategy of an outside patentee in vertically-related markets,” International Journal of Economics and Finance, 5, 102-112.
Chen, C. S. (2017) “Endogenous market structure and technology licensing,” The Japanese Economic Review, 68, 115-130.
Chen. H.C. and W.J. Liang (2007) “Strategic export policy in the presence of subcontracting,” Journal of Economics Integration, 22, 973-994.
Chen, Y., J. Ishikawa, and Z. Yu (2004) “Trade liberalization and strategic outsourcing,” Journal of International Economics, 63, 419-436.
Chen, Y. W., Y. P. Yang, F. S. Wang, and S. J. Wu (2014) “Technology licensing in mixed oligopoly,” International Review of Economics & Finance, 31, 193-204.
Din, H. R., K. F. Kao and W. J. Liang, (2013) “Patent licensing and double marginalization in vertically-related markets,” Taiwan Economic Review, 41, 27-47.
Eaton, J. and G.M. Grossman (1986) “Optimal trade and industrial policy under oligopoly,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101, 383-406.
Ghosh, A. and S. Saha (2008) “Trade policy in the presence of technology licensing,” Review of International Economics, 16, 45-68.
Hattori, K., and T. Yoshikawa (2016) “Free entry and social inefficiency under coopetition,” Journal of Economics, 118, 97-119.
Hoefele, A. (2016) “Endogenous product differentiation and international R&D policy,” International Review of Economics and Finance, 41, 335-346.
Hong, X., L. Yang, H. Zhang, and D. Zhao (2014) “The optimal licensing contract in a differentiated Stackelberg model,” The Scientific World Journal, 2014, 1-12.
Hotelling, H. (1929) “Stability in competition,” Economic Journal, 39, 41-57.
Ishida, J., T. Matsumura, and N. Matsushima (2011) “Market competition, R&D and firm profits in asymmetric oligopoly,” Journal of Industrial Economics, 59, 484-505.
Ishikawa, J., H. Morita, and H. Mukunoki (2010) “FDI in post-production services and product market competition,” Journal of International Economics, 82, 73-84.
Kabiraj, T. (2004) “Patent licensing in a leadership structure,” The Manchester School, 72, 188-205.
Kabiraj, T. (2005) “Technology transfer in a Stackelberg structure: licensing contracts and welfare,” The Manchester School, 73, 1-28.
Kamien, M. and Y. Tauman (1986) “Fees versus royalties and the private value of a patent,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101, 471-492.
Kamien, M. and Y. Tauman (2002) “Patent licensing: The inside story,” The Manchester School, 70, 504-519.
Kamien, M. I., S. S. Oren and Y. Tauman (1992) “Optimal licensing of cost-reducing innovation,” Journal of Mathematical Economics, 21, 483-508.
Kamien, M. I., L. Li and D. Samet (1989) “Bertrand competition with subcontracting,” RAND Journal of Economics, 20 (4), 553–567.
Kawabata, Y. (2010) “Strategic export policy in vertically related markets,” Bulletin of Economic Research, 62, 0307-3378.
Kawabata, Y. (2012) “Cost asymmetries and industrial policy in vertically related markets,” The Manchester School, 80, 633-649.
Kitagawa, T., Y. Masuda and M. Umezawa (2014) “Patent strength and optimal two-part tariff licensing with a potential rival,” Economics Letters, 123, 227-231.
Kishimoto, S. and S. Muto (2012) “Fee versus royalty policy in licensing through bargaining: An application of the Nash bargaining solution,” Bulletin of Economic Research, 64, 293-304.
Kuo, P. S., Y. S. Lin and C. H. Peng (2015) “International technology transfer and welfare,” Review of Development Economics, 20, 214-227.
Liang, W. J. and C. C. Mai (2006) “Validity of the principle of minimum differentiation under vertical subcontracting,” Regional Science and Urban Economics, 36, 378-384.
Maiti, D. and A. Mukherjee (2013) “Trade cost reduction, subcontracting and unionised Wage,” Labour Economics, 21, 103-110.
Matsumura, T., N. Matsushima, and S. Cato (2013) “Competitiveness and R&D competition revisited,” Economic Modelling, 31, 541-547.
Mukherjee, A. and A. Ray (2014) “Entry, profit and welfare under asymmetric R&D cost,” The Manchester School, 82, 284-295.
Mukherjee, A. and E. Pennings (2006) “Tariffs, licensing and market structure,” European Economic Review, 50, 1699-1707.
Muto, S. (1993) “On licensing policies in Bertrand competition,” Games and Economic Behavior, 5, 257-267.
Nguyen, X., P. Sgro and M. Nabin (2017) “Optimal licensing policy under vertical product differentiation,” Review of Development Economics, 21, 497-510.
Ornelas, E. and J. L. Turner (2008) “Trade liberalization, outsourcing, and the hold-up problem,” Journal of International Economics, 74, 225-241.
Parisotto, L. and A. Heal (2016) “Impacts of imported technology in Asia-Pacific developing countries: Evidence from firm-level data,” ESCAP Trade Insights: Issue No.16.
Qiu, L. D. (1997) “On the dynamic efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot equilibria,”Journal of Economic Theory, 75, 213-229.
Schumpeter, J. (1943) Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, London, Unwin University Books.
Sen, D. and Y. Tauman (2007) “General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation,” Games and Economic Behavior, 59, 163-186.
Shy, O. and R. Stenbacka (2003) “Strategic outsourcing,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 50, 203-224.
Singh, N. and X. Vives (1984) “Price and quantity competition in a differentiated duopoly,” Rand Journal of Economics, 15, 546-554.
Spiegel, Y. (1993) “Horizontal subcontracting,” Rand Journal of Economics, 24, 570-590.
Vives, X. (2008) “Innovation and competitive pressure,” The Journal of Industrial Economics, 56, 419-469.
Wang, K. C. A., W. J. Liang and P. S. Chou (2013) “Patent licensing under cost asymmetry among firms,” Economic Modelling, 31, 297-307.
Wang, X. H. (1998) “Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model,” Economics Letters, 60, 55-62.
Wang, X. H. (2002) “Fee versus royalty licensing in a differentiated Cournot duopoly,” Journal of Economics and Business, 54, 253-266.
Wang, X. H. and Yang, B. Z. (1999) “On licensing under Bertrand competition.” Australian Economic Papers, 38, 106-119.
Yang, L. and K. Maskus (2009) “Intellectual property rights, technology and exports in developing countries,” Journal of Development Economics, 90, 231-236.
 
 
 
 
第一頁 上一頁 下一頁 最後一頁 top
:::
無相關博士論文
 
無相關書籍
 
無相關著作
 
無相關點閱
 
QR Code
QRCODE

臺灣人文及社會科學引文索引資料庫

目前上線人數：573（臺灣：537，外國：36） ／ 本年度總使用人次：2645728 ／ 訪客人次（自102年09月）：68447573
國家圖書館著作權聲明 Copyright © 2013 All rights reserved.
本館地址: 100201臺北市中山南路20號． 本館地圖及交通資訊．
總機：(02)23619132．最佳瀏覽解析度為1024x768以上