|
Andreou, C., 2006, Standard, Advice, and Practical Reason, Journal of Moral Philosophy 3 (1): 57-67.
Andric, V., 2015, Objective Consequentialism and the Rationales of ‘“Ought” implies “CAN”’, Ratio 30(1): 72-87.
Anscombe, G. E. M., 1957, Intention, New York: Cornell University Press.
Bennett, J., 1981, Morality and Consequences, In McMurrin, S. (eds.), The Tanner Lectures on Human Values ll, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, pp. 47–116.
Bourget, D., & Chalmers, D., 2021, Philosophers on Philosophy: The 2020 Philpapers Survey, manuscripts.
Broome, J., 2013, Rationality Through Reasoning, Wiley-Blackwell.
Cavanaugh, T. A., 2006, Double Effect Reasoning: Doing Good and Avoiding Evil, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Chrisman, M., 2012, ‘Ought’ and Control, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3): 433-451.
Davidson, D., 1980, Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Davis, H., 1946, Moral and Pastoral Theology Volume 1, 4th edition, London: Longman.
Dreier, J., 2011, In defence of consequentializing, In Timmons, M. (eds.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 1, pp. 97-119.
Dworkin, R., 1984, Rights as Trumps, In Waldron, J. (eds.), Theories of Rights, Oxford University Press, pp. 153-67.
Dworkin, R., 2011, Justice for Hedgehogs, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Elster, J., 2012, Scanlon on Permissibility and Double Effect, Journal of Maral Philosophy 9(1): 75-102.
Estlund, D., 2007, Democratic Authority, Princeton University Press.
Feldman, F., 1986, Doing the Best We Can, Dordrecht: Reidel.
Feldman, F., 2006, Actual Utility, The Objection from Impracticality, and the Move to Expected Utility, Philosophical Studies 129(1): 49-79.
Fischer, J., Ravizza, M., & Copp, D., 1993, Quinn on Double Effect: The Problem of “Closeness”, Ethics, 103: 707–25.
FitzPatrick, W., 2006, The Intend/Foresee Distinction and the Problem of “Closeness”, Philosophical Studies 128 (3):585-617.
FitzPatrick, W., 2012a, Intention, permissibility and double effect, In Timmons, M. (eds.), Oxford studies in normative ethics 2, Oxford University Press, pp. 97-127.
FitzPatrick, W., 2012b, The doctrine of double effect: intention and permissibility, Philosophy Compass 7(3): 183—196.
Foot, P., 1967, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect, Oxford Review 5: 5-15.
Forschler, S., 2009, Truth and Acceptance conditions for moral statements can be identical: Further support for subjective consequentialism, Utilitas 21(3): 337-346.
Fruge, C., 2019, Possible intentions and the doctrine of double effect, Ethics, Medicine and Public Health 8:11-17.
Ghoos, J., 1951. L'Acte a double effet, étude de théologie positive, Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses 27: 30–52.
Gibbons, J., 2006, Access externalism, Mind 115(457): 19–39.
Goldberg, S., 2017, Should have known, Synthese 194 (8): 2836-2894.
Gury, J., 1874, Compendium Theologiae Moralis, Regensburg: Georgii Josephi Manz.
Hacking, I., 1967, Possibility, The Philosophical Review 76(2): 143–168.
Hanser, M., 2005, Permissibility and Practical Inference, Ethics 115 (3): 443-470.
Hart, H. L. A., 1967, Intention and Punishment, The Oxford Review (4): 5–22.
Haslanger, S., 2012, Resisting Reality: Social Construction and Social Critique, Oxford University Press.
Hawthorne, J., & Magidor, O., 2018, Reflections on the Ideology of Reasons, In Star, D. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, Oxford University Press, pp. 113-142.
Hills, A., 2010, Utilitarianism, contractualism and demandingness, The Philosophical Quarterly 60(239): 225–242.
Hooker, B., 2000, Ideal Code, Real World, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Jackson, F., 1991, Decision-theoretic consequentialism and the nearest and dearest objection, Ethics 101 (3): 461-482.
Jackson, F., & Smith, M., 2006, Absolutist Moral Theories, Journal of Philosophy 103 (6): 267-283.
Kamm, F. M., 2000, The doctrine of triple effect and why a rational agent need not intend the means to his end, Aristotelian Society Supplementary 74 (1):21–39.
Kamm, F. M., 2007, Intricate Ethics: Rights, Responsibilities, and Permissible Harm, New York: Oxford University Press.
Kant, I., 1998a, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, translated and edited by Gregor, M., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kant, I., 1998b, Critique of Pure Reason, translated and edited by Guyer, P., & Wood, A. W., Cambridge University Press.
Kiesewetter, B., 2018, How reasons are sensitive to available evidence, In McHugh, C., Way, J. & Whiting, D. (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical, Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 90-114.
Kolodny, N., 2011, Scanlon’s investigation: the relevance of intent to permissibility, Analytic Philosophy 52 (2): 100-123.
Korsgaard, C., 1986, the Right to Lie: Kant on Dealing with Evil, Philosophy & Public Affairs 15 (4): 325-349.
Korsgaard, M. C., 2005, Acting for a Reason, Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 40 (1):11-35.
Le Morvan, P., 2012, On ignorance: A vindication of the standard view, Philosophia, 40: 379–393.
Liao, S. M., 2016, The Closeness Problem and the Doctrine of Double Effect: A Way Forward, Criminal Law and Philosophy 10 (4): 849-863.
Lord, E., 2018, The Importance of Being Rational, Oxford University Press.
Mangan, J., 1949, An Historical Analysis of the Principle of Double Effect, Theological Studies, 10: 41-61.
Masek, L., 2010, Intentions, motives and the doctrine of double effect, Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240):567-585.
Masek, L., 2018, Intention, Character, and Double Effect, University of Notre Dame Press.
McMahan, J., 2009, Intention, permissibility, terrorism, and war, Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):345-372.
McPherson, L. K., 2007, Is Terrorism Distinctively Wrong?, Ethics 117: 524–546.
Moore, G. E., 1903. Principia Ethica, Cambridge: University Press.
Nelkin, D. K., & Rickless, S. C., 2015, So Close, Yet So Far: Why Solutions to the Closeness Problem for the Doctrine of Double Effect Fall Short, Nous 49 (2): 376-409.
Nelkin, D. K., & Rickless, S. C., 2014, Three Cheers for Double Effect, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):125-158.
Nussbaum, M., 2006, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership, Cambridge, MA: Bellknap Press.
Oderberg, D., 2000, Moral Theory: A Non-consequentialist Approach, Oxford: Blackwell.
Parfit, D., 2011a, On What Matters: Volume 1, Oxford University Press.
Parfit, D., 2011b, On What Matters: Volume 2, Oxford University Press.
Pogge, T., 2001, What We Can Reasonably Reject, Philosophical Issues 11 (1):118-147.
Quinn, W., 1989, Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The doctrine of double effect, Philosophy and Public Affairs 18 (4):334-351.
Rawls, J., 1999, A Theory of Justice, Belknap Press.
Robinson, P., 1996, Competing Theories of Justification: Deeds v. Reasons, In Andrew, S. and Smith, A. T. (eds.), Harm and Culpability, Oxford: Clarendon, pp. 45-70.
Rojas, J., 1995, St. Thomas' Treatise on Self-Defense Revisited, In Manning, E. (eds.), Thomistica: 89–123.
Saemi, A., 2009, Intention and Permissibility, Ethical Perspectives 16 (1):81-101.
Scanlon, T. M., 1982, Contractualism and Utilitarianism, in Sen, A. & Williams, B. (eds.), Utilitarianism and Beyond, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 103-128.
Scanlon, T. M., 1998, What We Owe to Each Other, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Scanlon, T. M., 2008, Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Scanlon, T. M., 2011, Precis of Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2): 459-463.
Scanlon, T. M., 2014, Being Realistic about Reasons, Oxford University Press.
Schick, T., & Vaughn, L., 2012, Doing philosophy: An introduction through thought experiments, New York: McGraw-Hill.
Schroeder, M., 2011, Oughts, Agents, and Actions, Philosophical Review 120 (1): 1-41.
Sellars, W., 1969, Language as Thought and as Communication, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 29 (4): 506–27.
Smith, A., 2005, Responsibility for attitudes: Activity and passivity in mental life, Ethics 115: 236–271.
Smith, H., 1983, Culpable ignorance, Philosophical Review 92(4): 543–571.
Smith, M., 2003, Neutral and relative value afyer Moore, Ethics 113 (3): 576-598.
Southwood, N., 2009, Morla Contractualism, Philosophy Compass 4 (6):926-937.
Stuchlik, J., 2012, A Critique of Scanlon on Double Effect, Journal of Moral Philosophy 9: 178-199.
Suikkanen, J., 2020, Contractualism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Thomson, J. J., 1985, The trolley problem, The Yale Law Journal 94 (5): 1395-1415.
Thomson, J. J., 1990, The Realm of Rights, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Thomson, J. J., 1991, Self-Defence, Philosophy & Public Affairs 20: 283-310.
Thomson, J. J., 2008, Turning the Trolley, Philosophy & Public Affairs 36 (4): 359-374.
Timmons, M., 2012, Moral Particularism, Moral Theory: An Introduction, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Wedgwood, R., 2011, Defending Double Effect, Ratio 24 (4): 384-401.
Willard-Kyle, C., 2020, Being in a Position to Know is the Norm of Assertion, Pacific Phillosophical Quarterly 101 (2): 328-352.
Williams, B., 1979, Internal and External Reasons, In Harrison, R. (ed.), Rational Action, Cambridge University Press, pp. 101-113.
Williams, B., 1981, Ought and Moral Obligation, Moral Luck, Oxford University Press: 114–23.
Williams, B., 1988, Consequentialism and Integrity, In Scheffler, S. (eds.), Consequentialism and its Critics, Oxford University Press, pp. 20-50.
|