本文以最適控制理論，說明被保險人在獎懲費率制度下的動態調整行為。從被保險人的自留損失與全民健保保費負擔的最適控制模型分析得知，在獎懲費率制度下，被保險人為追求長期總效用的最大，對健保理賠的需求，會作長期性規劃。被保險人會經由自留損失的最適調整，來使長期的保費負擔達到其最適水準。本文也引用經濟理論完全預知(perfect foresight)模型的內函，來說明主管機關宣布於未來將要實施新的健保政策後，對被保險人所產生的宣示效果。一個完全預知的被保險人在主管機關宣布將於未來某一時刻實施新的健保措施（如調高健保的自負額）後，就會將此訊息嵌入自己的訊息集合內，進而改變被保險人的預期。透過預期的修正，因而改變被保險人目前的行為模式。

　　　　　In this study the optimal control technique was used to explore the dynamic adjustment behavior of the insured in a bonus malus system of social health insurance. It is shown that the insured will seek to determine the optimal time path of his loss retention so as to keep his premium expansion in an optimal level and thus to maximize his whole life total utility. The dynamic adjustment processes under the policy announce effect will also develop in this study. A perfect foresight insured will automatically revise his information set and hence to correct his expectation as the policy has been announced.