史萊瑪赫、海德格的〈存有與時間〉和高達美都曾討論詮釋學循環的概念。雖然海德格認為他的詮釋學循環是瞭解（ Verstehen, understanding ）本身的結構，但本文要指出，它依然擁有史萊瑪赫詮釋學循環的性格--一個方法論的概念。這是說，兩者都是用以證實一個結論。另一方面，高達美雖號稱其詮釋學循環來自海德格哲學，不過，本文卻要指出高達美的詮釋學循環，已完全擺脫方法論的意涵，因為它不是用以證實一個結論，而是讓真理得以出現。

　　　　　The concept of hermeneutic circle appears in the works of Schleierrmacher, Heidegger and Gadamer. In this essay I argue that although Heidegger, in Being and Time, thinks that his concept of hermeneutic circle belongs to the structure of understanding, it still possesses a characteristic of Schleiermacher's hermeneutic circle, namely, both of them are methodological concepts. However, although Gadamer claims that his concept of hermeneutic circle is developed out of Heidegger's philosophy, I show that it is no longer a methodological concept, but is the happening of truth.