本文以一個垂直產品區隔模型分析雙占廠商採用品質提昇技術之意願，並展現了市場競爭與技術條件間極為有趣的互動。首先，基於藉產品區隔以削弱價格競爭之策略性考量，廠商有時要避免生產其技術條件所允許的最高品質。這種刻意的自我設限遂減低廠商採用產品創新之意願。其次，在只有一個廠商採用產品創新時，兩廠的均衡品質皆會提高，但品質差異的絕對值會增大。一般而言，產品創新會深化廠商間的品質區隔而使其差異擴大。

　　　　　We analyze firms' incentives for adopting a quality-improving technology in a model where two symmetric firms compete both in quality and in price. The paper illustrates an interesting interplay between technological and market conditions. On the one hand , due to the need for product differentiation in order to soften price competition, a firm sometimes has to restrain itself from producing its technologically maximum quality. This restraint in market competition may then limit a firm's incentive for adopting a quality-improving technology. On the other hand, firms' technology adoption decisions impact their subsequent quality competition in an interesting way. We show that in the equilibrium outcome where only one firm adopts a new technology, both the innovating firm and the non-innovating firm get to upgrade their qualities. Although both firms increase their qualities with the sole innovating firm's adoption, the magnitude of their quality gap is, however, enlarged. There therefore is a tendency toward less equalized firms in an industry along with the adoption of a product innovation.