審計學行為研究的主要領域之一，是探討影響審計決策(判斷)績效的因素。雖然審計判斷續效決定於審計人員的專業知識，而後者又受能力、動機與環境因素影響；不過，Libby (1995)指出，幾乎所有的實驗研究均不考慮動機這一項因素；並且只有在特定情況下，才會考慮環境因素的影響。本研究採用實驗方法，具體探討努力與誘因機制對審計決策績致的影響，並測試代理理論的基本假設；我們也慮環境不確定性因素，推測其為審計訴訟風險。主要的實驗結果顯示：在利潤分享契約或相對績效評估契約下，受試者的努力程度均與決策績效有顯著的正向關係。誘因契約型態(利潤分享或相對績效評估誘因契約)對審計判斷續效有顯著的影響，其中受試者在利潤分享契約之下的審計決策績效，顯著地高於在相對績效評估契約下的審計決策績效，此與部分經濟理論的預測一致。另外，部分結果顯示：知識與決策績效亦有顯著的正向相關。不過，審計訴訟風險對審計判斷續效沒有顯著的影響。我們也討論實驗結果對研究與實務的意涵。

One of the fundamental issues in the studies of auditing behavioral research is the determinant of audit decision (judgment) performance regarding knowledge factor, where audit judgment performance and knowledge are affected by ability, motivation, and environment. The motivation and the resulting cognitive effort factors are, however, exogenous in the literature. In addition, the environmental factor is usually not considered. This study relaxes these two assumptions, in which the common environmental uncertainty of the audit market is supposed to be the audit litigation risk. We explore the relationships among effort, incentive scheme, and decision performance and test the underlying assumption of the agency theory. The incentive scheme includes both the profit sharing contract and the relative performance evaluation contract. The experimental results indicate that, under either type of incentive scheme, effort is significantly positive related to audit decision performance. Moreover, decision performance differs depending on the types of incentive contract, in that it is significantly greater under the profit sharing contract than under the relative performance evaluation contract. These findings are consistent with the economic hypothesis, but are contrary to the behavioral hypothesis. Some of the evidence shows that knowledge is significantly related to judgment performance. However, the audit judgment performance is not significantly affected by audit litigation risk under either type of incentive contract. The implications for research and practice are also discussed.