According to Plato's Phaedo, Socrates doesn't content himself with the presocratic physiologists who explain the causes of being with material element or voυ? like anaxagoras, so that he assumes the existence of ideas as the cause of γενεσι? in order to investigate the immortality of soul. In comparison with Aristotle's report, Socrates reduces his discussions with sophists into definitive topics and searches for the καθολον in his definition of the ethical, but he neither asserts the separation of καθολον nor affirms the existence of ideas. Owing to this difference of the delivered reports between Plato and Aristotle, I try to investigate the development from Socrates' διαλεγεσθαι to Plato's theory of idea. This paper is divided into three steps as following: 1.A methodical consideration: on the differences between the natural and the ethical in reason and sensation. 2.On the hypothesis of ideas, its relation to the ethical and the acquisition of ideas. 3.conclusion. By the first step, I analyze the characteristics of the ethical and put them into the division of reason and sensation in order to make distinctive marks between them. By the second step, I inquire the hypothesis of ideas into the following points of view: 1.on the hypothesis of ideas themselves and their characteristics, 2.on the implication of ideas, 3.on the μεθεσι? of ideas and the participants, 4.on the relation between ethical ideas. Afterwards, I summarize L. C.-H. Chen's study of 'Ideenschau' in his last work: Acquiring Knowledge of the Ideas. Consequently, it concludes as following: 1.Socrates considers the ethical as theoretical and sets down the definitive boundary of it without separating it form the sensible. 2.Out of Socrates' καθολον, Plato hypothesizes the existence of ideas and makes the objects of knowledge insensible and perpetual. 3.Theμεθεσι? is this explanation of causality. 4.According to L. C.-H. Chen, it admits of the acquisition of ideas in Plato's theory of ideas. 5. In Plato's later theory of ideas, he uses the method of διαρετικη by which the relation between ιδεαι and γενοιand γενοι can be distinctively marked out.