The twofold purpose of this article is (1) to illustrate how Zhu Zi interpreted the general meaning of “master oneself and return to propriety” of the Analects, and (2) to explain the hermeneutical principles advanced by later Confucianists to criticize Zhu. In the analysis of the article, they are shown to have misunderstood Zhu’s interpretation of the issue because of their faulty hermeneutical approaches. Furthermore, having made attempts to discredit the hermeneutical principles brought forth by Zhu’s interpretative pattern, they still failed to solve the complex controversy over the classic interpretation. Hence, the second section of the article starts with the definition of the very meaning of three critical parts of Zhu’s thought, “master oneself”, “return to propriety”, and “humanity”. To avoid misunderstanding Zhu’s critical thought, I think we must also grasp Zhu’s general thought as expounded in other works related to the interpretation of the issue, when forming our understanding of it from the Collected Commentaries on the Analects (Lun-yü ji-zhu). In the third section of the article, three Confucianists, Dai Zhen (1723-1777) of Qing Dynasty, Tokugawa Japan’s Ogyü Sorai (1666-1728) of the Ancient-Learning School, and textual scholar, Naikai Liken (1732-1817) of Kaidokudo Academy, all three typical critics of Zhu Zi, are treated as representative of mistaken criticism of Zhu. They all held that Zhu violated the principle of the ‘linguistic’ use in interpreting the Confucian Classics. The first view is best represented by the interpretation of Dai Zhen. He argued that Zhu misconstrued the Six Classics by applying both Buddhist and Taoist linguistic usages to Confucianism, which led to an obscure mixture of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism. The second view was that Zhu’s interpretation of the Classics contradicted the context of historical language. It was subdivided into the violation of the language context of the Confucius’ age and that of the language context of the age of the Six Classics. Liken favored the former; Sorai, the latter. Lastly, the article concludes that in addition to the confinement of Zhu's freedom of interpretation within these hermeneutical principles, the critics must have been able to enter the nucleus of Zhu’s interpretation, otherwise, their faculty of understanding of what was beyond their knowledge would be obstructed by the limitation of their narrow-minded knowledge.