The main purpose of this paper is to explore the Asian-Pacific strategy of the Bush administration. The author tries to understand the essence of the strategy by examining the political remarks and behaviors of George W. Bush and his diplomatic team members, U.S. concrete actions on national security, its actual deployment in the Asian-Pacific area, and the interactions between the opposing and supporting forces at home and abroad. As the main theme of this paper, it is argued, that although it would be inevitable for the Americans to compromise with various internal and external forces and even with their allies due to the complexity of the strategy, most of the dimensions of the strategy have been being shaped one way or another. Indeed, judging from U.S. actual deployment in this area like reconstructing and strengthening some of its military bases in this area, army shift to Asia from Europe, expanding its alliance relationship with Japan, South Korea and Australia, rapprochement with Vietnam, India and Indonesia, congaing with China, North Korea and Russia, arms sales to Taiwan, and researching and testing National Missile Defense System, the author believes that many aspects of U.S. Asian-Pacific strategy have been being put into practice.