國際之間的發展經驗顯示，開發中國家很難藉由自己的技術研發來趕上先進國家的技術水平。為了克服此一障礙，有些國家會採嚴苛的貿易管制措施來引進外國的資本與技術。惟此一政策之效果與貿易政策的種類有很大之關係。本文建立一個兩國兩廠商模型，假設在自由貿易之下本國市場由外國廠商獨佔，且此一外國廠商不會對本國進行技術授權。但是只要本國（進口國）政府採行些微之關稅，或是對進口量稍作限制，即可誘使外國廠商將技術完全授權予本國廠商。此外，本文亦發現，技術授權之權利金價格會隨著關稅稅率的增加而逐漸減少，但並不會隨著配額數量的變化而改變，於是在等量配額的比較基礎上，本國廠商於關稅政策下的產量將高於在配額政策下的水準，而國內之市場價格在關稅政策下亦會比在配額政策下為低。因此，關稅與配額二政策雖然都具有引進外國技術的效果，但不論就本國產業之保護效果或是就本國之福利水準而言，關稅政策皆優於配額政策。另一方面，就本國之福利水準而言，關稅政策皆優於配額政策。

　　　　　International development experiences have shown that it is difficult for developing countries to catch up with the technology level of developed countries. To overcome this difficulty, developing countries often adopt some trade measures to help import foreign advanced technologies. This paper uses a two-country duopoly model to examine the efficacy of tariff and quota policies. It is found that a slight tariff or quota restriction can induce a complete foreign technology transfer from the foreign monopolist to the domestic potential entrant. The optimal royalty payment of the technology transfer is negatively related to tariff rates but it does not vary with the level of quota restriction. Finally, domestic welfare is necessarily higher but foreign welfare is necessarily lower under the tariff policy than the equivalent quota policy.