沒有人懷疑意圖的道德相關性，特別是在判斷一個人的道德人格或行為動機時。問題是，意圖在判斷行為的道德性質時扮演什麼角色呢？當代學者對於這個問題有很多不同意見。有主張意圖與行為道德性之判斷密切相關者，也有主張，在特定意義下，意圖與行為道德性之判斷毫無關係者。J. L. A. Garcia稱 前者為「意圖相關倫理」(intention-sensitive ethics)，後者為「意圖無關倫理」(irrelevance thesis)。我在這篇論文當中要為特定意涵的「意圖無關倫理」辯 護，結論更將指出，忽略意圖在特定觀點下與行為的道德判斷無關，是當代基本倫理學諸多混淆的原因之一。文分三部分：首先我先介紹這個爭論的問題意識及其重要性，其次，我要分別討論兩個「意圖無關倫理」支持者的論述以及兩個「意圖相關倫理」者的立場，並試圖整合他們的看法，指出他們論述的缺失。最後，在這個討論之上，我將提出我自已對於「意圖無關倫理」的看法與理由。

While no one doubts the moral relevance of intention in assessing the moral character of the agent, it is controversial whether and how intention is relevant or irrelevant to the determination of the moral status of actions. J. Garcia calls the position endorsing the relevance of intention in determining the moral status of actions "intention-sensitive ethics" (ISE) and its antithesis "irrelevance thesis"(IT). In this article I contend that IT is in certain significant senses defensible. Ignoring this could bring about serious confusion in assessing the moral quality of an action. The article is structured as follows: (1) Introducing the issue and its significance. (2) Discussing the positions of two IT proponents, Judith Jarvis Thomson and James Rachels, and then, respectively, the positions of their critics, J. L. A. Garcia and Tho□as D. Sullivan. (3) Presenting my own arguments based on the insights acquired from the discussion.