The purpose of this paper is to explore how Wittgenstein, in his "Bemerkungen fiber Frazer's Golden Bough", argues against the legitimacy of scientific and historical explanation on religious activity. It is pointed out that Wittgenstein first introduces a criterion of distinguishing religious activities from non-religious ones, then argues both that religious activities are not subject to scientific and historical explanation, and that whatever subjects to scientific and historical explanation cannot be a religious activity. As a result, for Wittgenstein, the notion of a scientific or historical explanation on religion is conceptually inconsistent. More specifically, Wittgenstein's argument goes like this: An activity is a religious activity because it is generated from a synoptic representation of its performer. The synoptic representation is both the cause and the constitutional principle of the religious activity, and it is also what makes the activity to be with any religious significance for its performer. However, the synoptic representation can be realized in various activities with very different physical properties or histories; moreover, an activity with specific physical properties or history can be with or without religious significance -- whether or not it has any religious significance depends on whether or not it is generated from a synoptic representation. Synoptic representation cannot be found in the eyes of the person who carries out scientific or historical study. Therefore, it is not only that a scientific or historical study is not a suitable way of studying religious activity, but also that the subject matter of such study cannot be religious.