總統大選後，我國首次出現總統與立法院多數黨不同黨的狀況，此時憲政體制究竟應定位為「偏向總統制的雙首長制」，還是「偏向內客制的雙首長制」？根據當年國發會共識，政?體制是以建立「改良式雙首長制」為目標，當時參與修憲之民進黨對此亦有共識。 九七修憲後我國政府體制應仍具有自動換軌機制，當總統所屬政黨能掌握立法院過半席次時，會因黨政運作的結果偏向總統制；反之，總統所屬政黨無法掌握立法院過半席次，體制唯有偏內內閣制方能有效運作；並確保政治之穩定。 在少數政府之下，極可能出現「多數黨主導立法，卻是在野黨；少數黨無力主導立法，卻是執政黨」的現象。聯合政府固然會對總統之權力產生牽制，惟基於政府有效運作與政治穩定之考量，為確保政?能獲得立法院穩定多數立委的支持，聯合政府恐怕是不得不作的次佳選擇。在我國現行政府體制之下，除非行政院由立法院多數黨或多數黨聯盟主心，否則行政與立法之關係將呈現衝突對立，而非融合的關係；政治也不可能穩定。 兩年來少數政府的失敗，已充皆說明：在總統無法掌握立法院過半席次的情況下，我國並不具備施行總統制的要件。政府籌組之必要條件，是必須確保其得以穩定有效運作。就我國而言，在立法院沒有政黨席次過半的情況下，只有籌組多數聯合政府，才符合此一基本要件。

　　　　　Since the new government born from 2000 presidential election in Taiwan, its presidency and the Legislative Yuan’s majority seats have been under different parties’ control. Meanwhile, it is the first time in Taiwan that the president and the Legislative Yuan’s majority belong toe different parties. Under this situation, it becomes a vague zone on the issue that Taiwan’s constitutional system should be considered to be “dual leadership system that close to presidential system,” or ”dual leadership system that close to cabinet system.” As a matter of fact, according to the consensus reached by the KMT and the DDOP in the National Development Council held in 1996, the constitutional device for government system was aimed at the improved dual leadership system“. Nevertheless, Taiwan’s government system should still have the “alternating” mechanism after 1997 constitutional revision. If the president’s party can control the Legislative Yunn’s majority seats, the system should be close to the presidential system. On the other hand, if the president’s party can not take hold on the Legislative Yuan’s majority seats, the system can only be effectively operated under the cabinet system to assure the government’s effective operation and political stability. In a minority government, it is highly possible that the majority party, serving the role of the oppositional party; dominates the policy-making process; however, the minority cannot dominate the policy-making process despite that it is a ruling party. Therefore, to help the government’s well operation, the maintain political stability, and to get support from the Legislative Yuan’s majority party, “coalition government” can be a less better choice though it may weakened the president’s power. In reality, the interactions between the Executive Yuan and the Legislative Yuan are always filled with conflicts and confrontations. This condition could persist unless the Legislative Yuan’s majority party or party Executive Yuan under the current system. With the experiences that the minority government could not work well in the past three years, it shows that Taiwan government’s system becomes cripple if it is rune under a presidential system where the President’s party cannot dominate the policy-making process in the Legislative Yuan. To date, since there is no any party dominating majority in the Legislative Yuan, there is a need for a coalition government to assure the political stability and hence and hence put the government system into good operation.