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題名:總經理更換與相對績效評估
書刊名:人力資源管理學報
作者:楊朝旭 引用關係蔡柳卿 引用關係
作者(外文):Young, Chaur-shiuhTsai, Liu-ching
出版日期:2003
卷期:3:1
頁次:頁63-80
主題關鍵詞:代理理論相對績效評估總經理更換Agency theoryRelative performance evaluationCEO turnover
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
相關次數:
  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(15) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:15
  • 共同引用共同引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:54
本研究旨在探討當公司處於高競爭性的產業時,相較於較低競爭的產業而言,是否董事會較有可能採用相對績效評估指標來識別並解聘不適任的總經理?以我國上市公司為研究樣本,採Logit迴歸模式進行實證分析,結果發現在控制其他影響總經理更換的因素後,高競爭產業中的公司,其相對績效評估指標和總經理更換機率的負向關係較強;而在低競爭的產業中,則是公司本身的會計績效指標和總經理更換機率的負向關係較強。此結果代表在高競爭產業中,董事會較可能採用相對績效評估指標來濾除總經理無法控制的不確定因素,然而在低競爭產業中,董事會則較偏好以公司本身的會計績效指標來判斷總經理是否適任。
This paper examines whether boards of director in highly competitive industries is more likely to use relative performance evaluation (RPE) to identify unfit CEOs than in less competitive industries. Using Logit regression analysis, we find that the frequency of CEO turnover is more closely associated with RPE-based (firm-specific) accounting measures in high (low) competition industries than in low (high) competition industries after controlling the determinants of CEO turnover. This evidence from the Taiwanese industries supports Defond and Park's (1999) argument that competition is likely to enhance the usefulness of RPE.
期刊論文
1.Weintrop, J. B.、Puffer, S. M.(1991)。Corporate Performance and CEO Turnover: The Role of Performance Expectations。Administrative Science Quarterly,36,1-19。  new window
2.Diamond, D. W.、Verrechia, R. E.(1982)。Optimal Managerial Contracts and Equilibrium Security Prices。Journal of Finance,37,275-287。  new window
3.Gibbons, R.、Murphy, K.(1990)。Relative Performance Evaluation and Chief Executive Officers。Industrial and Labor Relations,43,30-51。  new window
4.Warner, Jerold B.、Watts, Ross L.、Wruck, Karen H.(1988)。Stock price and top management changes。Journal of Financial Economics,20,461-492。  new window
5.Janakiraman, S. N.、Lambert, R. A.、Larcker, D. F.(1992)。An Empirical Investigation of the Relative Performance Evaluation Hypothesis。Journal of Accounting Research,30(1),53-69。  new window
6.Indjejikian, Raffi J.(1999)。Performance evaluation and compensation research: An agency perspective。Accounting Horizons,13(2),147-157。  new window
7.Holmström, Bengt(1982)。Moral Hazard in Teams。The Bell Journal of Economics,13(2),324-340。  new window
8.Banker, Rajiv D.、Datar, Srikant M.(1989)。Sensitivity, precision, and linear aggregation of signals for performance evaluation。Journal of Accounting Research,27(1),21-39。  new window
9.Coughlan, A. T.、Schmidt, Ronald M.(1985)。Executive compensation, management turnover, and firm performance: An empirical investigation。Journal of Accounting and Economics,7(1-3),43-66。  new window
10.Murphy, Kevin J.、Zimmerman, Jerold L.(1993)。Financial Performance Surrounding CEO Turnover。Journal of Accounting and Economics,16(1-3),273-315。  new window
11.Defond, Mark L.、Park, Chul W.(1999)。The Effect of Competition on CEO Turnover。Journal of Accounting and Economics,27(1),35-56。  new window
12.Antle, Rick、Smith, Abbie(1986)。An empirical investigation of the relative performance evaluation of corporate executives。Journal of Accounting Research,24(1),1-39。  new window
13.Hölmstrom, Bengt(1979)。Moral Hazard and Observability。The Bell Journal of Economics,10(1),74-91。  new window
14.Kaplan, S. N.(1994)。Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: a Comparison of Japan and the United States。Journal of Political Economy,102(3),510-546。  new window
15.Weisbach, Michael S.(1988)。Outside directors and CEO turnover。Journal of Financial Economics,20(1/2),431-460。  new window
16.Rhoades, Stephen A.(1993)。The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index。Federal Reserve Bulletin,79(3),188-189。  new window
17.Jensen, Michael C.、Murphy, Kevin J.(1990)。Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives。Journal of Political Economy,98(2),225-264。  new window
18.Jensen, Michael C.、Meckling, William H.(1976)。Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure。Journal of Financial Economics,3(4),305-360。  new window
圖書
1.Vancil, Richard F.(1987)。Passing the Baton: Managing the Process of CEO Succession。Harvard Business School Press。  new window
2.Hirschman, Albert O.(1970)。Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States。Harvard University Press。  new window
其他
1.王裕民(1999)。福特六和陣前換將,重新佈局。  延伸查詢new window
2.官如玉(2001)。大企業執行長,頻頻走馬換。  延伸查詢new window
3.林穎芬(1998)。台灣上市公司控管機制之硏究--探討家族與非家族企業高階主管薪酬與離職的控管效果。  延伸查詢new window
4.辜秋屛(1997)。高階主管酬勞與公司績效之硏究。  延伸查詢new window
5.Daton D. R. & Todor, W. D.(1979)。The attenuating effects of internal mobility on employee turnover: Multiple field assessments。  new window
6.Feltham, G. & Xie, J.(1994)。Performance measure congruity and diversity in multi-task principal/agent relation。  new window
7.Kim, J.(1996)。Additional evidence on relative performance evaluation hypothesis。  new window
8.Nalebuff, B. J. & Stiglitz, J. E.(1983)。Information, competition, and markets。  new window
9.Rosen(199012)。Contracts and the market for executives。  new window
10.Salancik, G. R. & Meindl, J. R.(1984)。Corporate attributions as strategic illusions of management control。  new window
 
 
 
 
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