本文運用現代經濟學的理論和方法，以跨國企業投資中的利益創造和利益分配為中心，構造了一個賽局分析的理論架構，不僅對地主國外資政和實政做出了有效的解釋，彌補了現有理論的缺失，而且對跨國企業投資者的投資行為和地主國的引資行為及其互動關係作出了統一的說明，形成了一個比較完整的跨國投資理論。 研究者通過高度抽象的假設條件之下，跨國企業與地主國之間的完全信息靜態和動態賽局分析，從不同角度論證了這一最適點的存在，同時得出一個基本推論：在其他條件不變的情況下，地主國外資優惠政策的最適水平應該與其外資需求的迫切程度或資本缺口的大小成正比，與其投資環境的優越程度成反比。運用這一推論，研究者對我國近年來外資優惠政策的演變歷程，進行了系統的理論說明。

　　　　　The author, by means of modern economic theories and methods, constructs a theoretical framework of game analysis which centers on the creation and distribution of return on transnational corporation investment. His work not only fills certain blanks in the existing theories through effectively explaining the establishment and implementation of a host country's foreign investment policy, but also consistently analyzes the investing behavior of the transnational corporation investors, the actions taken by the host country to attract foreign fund, and the interaction between the two sides. Thus, he creates a relatively complete theory of international investment. Under quite simplified assumption, author carry through the complete information static game analysis and the complete information dynamic analysis, and deduced the conclusion: keeping other conditions unchangeable, the best preferential level to foreign investment should change in corporation with the host country's demand for FDI or its capital gap, and should be concerned with its investment circumstance. With this interference, author successfully explains the evolution process of the preferential policy of our country in the last four decades.