本文試圖運用「壓力型體制」的概念來解釋中國大陸鄉村支配關係的形成，認為帶有強制性的行政體制已導致村民自治難以發揮其制度上的影響效應。主要探討內容：第一，壓力型體制下鄉村支配關係的形成，這實質上是一種政治承包制，在目標責任制與一票否決制的設計下排除了農民與國家間的適度分權。第二，壓力型體制下的鄉村關係所產生的種種弊端，包括鄉鎮基層政權機構膨脹、農民負擔加重與提供幹部腐化的機會等；在政績政治的掛帥下導致普遍的制度性說謊與政府暴力。第三，農民對基層政權過度干預村民自治制度運作所採取的抵制策略，包括罷免權的運用與集體越級上訪所爆發的種種抗爭。第四，分析當前中共進行稅費改革與村民自治制度的關係，指出費改稅雖可降低鄉村幹部完成國家任務的難度並減輕農民負擔，但村民自治的實踐卻無法在制度上消除農民的負擔。最後，作者認為轉換既存鄉鎮基層政權的合法性基礎不失為調整鄉村支配關係的變革措施之一，甚至中國大陸農民必須超越鄉鎮長直接選舉這個層次，始能真正重構國家與農民的關係。

　　　　　This article aims to use the term “pressurized system” to explain the formation of dominated relationship between township town government and village self-government—how do the obligatory administrative system inhibit the operation of village self-government system and make it unable to elaborate institutional influencingeffect? This article discusses: 1. The dominated relationship between township and village is substantially “political contract system”; the design of responsibility system for attaining targets and “appointing cadres on the basis of their performance” will exclude the reasonable allocation of power between the state and peasants. 2. The relationship between township and village under pressurized system produces various of defects, such as swelling the organization of township government, aggravating the burden of farmers and providing opportunities for corruption. 3. Peasants use the strategy of recall and appeal to boycott township government excessively intervene the operation of village self-government system. 4. Discussing the interaction of rural tax reform and village selfgovernment. Finally, the author points out that transformation of the legitimacy for township government will become a good reforming measure to accommodate the dominated relationship between township and village—even the Chinese peasants must exceed the level of direct election for township magistrates, so it will really restructure the relationship between the state and peasants.