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題名：從高階主管薪酬的研究探討代理理論在臺灣的適用程度
書刊名：管理學報
作者：林穎芬 引用關係／劉維琪 引用關係
作者(外文)：Lin, Ying-fen／Liu, Victor Wei-chi
出版日期：2003
卷期：20:2
頁次：頁365-395
主題關鍵詞：代理理論；薪酬；家族企業；Agency theory；Compensation；Family enterprises
原始連結：連回原系統網址new window
相關次數：
  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(39) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:39
  • 共同引用共同引用:25
  • 點閱點閱:81
高階主管的薪酬設計是公司可用以減少代理問題的控制機制，然而若將台灣家族企業的特質與代理理論所奠基的假設相對照，可看出代理理論的假設，例如自利、組織成員目標衝突與資訊不對稱等，可能無法真切描述家族企業的運作情形，因此，是否所有的企業都適用於代理理論的推論，是本研究希望探討的一項議題。 本研究以非家族企業與家族企業，進行高階主管薪酬的研究，以1995-1997年上市公司製造業為研究樣本，以LISREL模式驗證假說。 本研究的重要研究結論為:一、代理理論在台灣的適用範疇為非家族企業，二、代理理論中以績效決定高階主管的薪酬的控制機制在台灣非家族企業的執行是有效果的，三、外部董事在非家族企業高階主管薪酬的決定上佔有重要地位，四、評估高階主管的績效,會計基礎重於市場基礎。
CEO compensation is a type of control mechanism that companies use to reduce the agency problem. However, the agency theory, which is the presumption of self-interest, conflict of interests and goals, and asymmetric information, is unable to grasp the practical reality and special characteristics of Taiwan’s family businesses. This paper discussed whether all companies are suitable to be studied by the agency theory. This paper divided companies into family enterprises and non-family enterprises. We investigate the influence of company performance, board control, external blockholder control and the possibly for company growth on CEO compensation. The samples used in the paper for CEO compensation had come from listed manufacturing companies between 1995-1997. The samples were verified by using the LISREL model. This paper’s conclusion is as follows: 1. The agency theory is suitable for non-family enterprises in Taiwan, but unsuitable for family enterprises. 2.Within the agency theory, the hypothesis that performance determines CEO compensation has been found to be true in non-family enterprises in Taiwan. 3.External board members play an important role in determining CEO compensation in non-family enterprises in Taiwan. 4.An accounting basis is more important that a market basis for determining CEO performance.
期刊論文
1.Lewellen, Wilbur G.、Loderer, Claudio、Martin, Kenneth(1987)。Executive Compensation and Executive Incentive Problems: An Empirical Analysis。Journal of Accounting and Economics，9(3)，287-310。  new window
2.Hallock, Kevin F.(1997)。Reciprocally Interlocking Boards of Directors and Executive Compensation。Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis，32(3)，331-344。  new window
3.Walsh, James P.、Seward, James K.(1990)。On the Efficiency of Internal and External Corporate Control Mechanisms。Academy of Management Review，15(3)，421-458。  new window
4.Rediker, K. J.、Seth, A.(1995)。Boards of directors and substitution effects of alternative governance mechanisms。Strategic Management Journal，16(2)，85-99。  new window
5.Tosi, H.、Gomez-Mejia, L. R.(1989)。The decoupling of CEO pay and performance: An agency theory perspective。Administrative Science Quarterly，34，169-189。  new window
6.Conyon, M. J.、Peck, S. I.(1998)。Board Control, Remuneration Committees, and Top Management Compensation。The Academy of Management Journal，41(2)，146-157。  new window
7.Kerr, J. L.、Bettis, R. A.(1987)。Boards of Directors, Top Management Compensation, and Shareholder Returns。Academy of Management Journal，30(1)，645-664。  new window
8.陳昭全、陳曉萍、Meindl, J. R.(1998)。How can cooperation be fostered? The cultural effects of individualism-collectivism。Academy of Management Review，23(2)，285-304。  new window
9.Beatty, Randolph P.、Zajac, Edward J.(1994)。Managerial incentives, monitoring, and risk bearing: A study of executive compensation, ownership, and board structure in initial public offerings。Administrative Science Quarterly，39(2)，313-335。  new window
10.Williamson, Oliver E.(1988)。Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance。The Journal of Finance，43(3)，567-591。  new window
11.Hart, Oliver(1995)。Corporate Governance: some theory and implications。Economic Journal，105(430)，678-689。  new window
12.Gaver, Jennifer J.、Gaver, Kenneth M.(1993)。Additional evidence on the association between the investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies。Journal of Accounting and Economics，16(1-3)，125-160。  new window
13.Mehran, Hamid(1995)。Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance。Journal of Financial Economics，38(2)，163-184。  new window
14.Smith, Clifford W. Jr.、Watts, Ross L.(1992)。The Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate Financing, Dividend, and Compensation Policies。Journal of Financial Economics，32(3)，263-292。  new window
15.Core, John E.(2000)。The directors' and officers' insurance premium: An outside assessment of the quality of corporate governance。Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization，16(2)，449-477。  new window
16.Core, John E.、Holthausen, Robert W.、Larcker, David F.(1999)。Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance。Journal of Financial Economics，51(3)，371-406。  new window
17.Sloan, Richard Geoffrey(1993)。Accounting earnings and top executive compensation。Journal of Accounting and Economics，16(1-3)，55-100。  new window
18.Davis, James H.、Schoorman, F. David、Donaldson, Lex(1997)。Toward a stewardship theory of management。The Academy of Management Review，22(1)，20-47。  new window
19.Boyd, Brian K.(1994)。Board Control and CEO Compensation。Strategic Management Journal，15(5)，335-344。  new window
20.Main, B. G. M.、Johnston, J.(1993)。Remuneration committees and corporate governance。Accounting and Business Research，23(sup1.)，351-362。  new window
21.Rosenstein, Stuart、Wyatt, Jeffrey G.(1990)。Outside Directors, Board Independence, and Shareholder Wealth。Journal of Financial Economics，26(2)，175-191。  new window
22.嚴奇峰(19940100)。臺灣傳統家族企業極端共存組織現象之探討：系統穩態觀點。管理評論，13(1)，1-22。new window  延伸查詢new window
23.Shleifer, Andrei、Vishny, Robert W.(1997)。A survey of corporate governance。The Journal of Finance，52(2)，737-783。  new window
24.Baysinger, Barry D.、Hoskisson, Robert E.(1990)。The composition of boards of directors and strategic control: effects on corporate strategy。Academy of Management Review，15(1)，72-87。  new window
25.Jensen, Michael C.、Murphy, Kevin J.(1990)。Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives。Journal of Political Economy，98(2)，225-264。  new window
26.Jensen, Michael C.、Meckling, William H.(1976)。Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure。Journal of Financial Economics，3(4)，305-360。  new window
27.林嬋娟、辜秋屏、辜秋萍(1997)。國內上市公司高階主管酬勞知多少？。會計研究月刊，139，52-63。  延伸查詢new window
28.Beatty, R. P.、Zajac, E. J.(1987)。CEO change and firm performance in large corporations: Succession effects and manager shifts。Strategic Management Journal，8，305-317。  new window
29.Davis, James H.、Schoorman, F. David、Donaldson, Lex(1997)。Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson Reply: The Distinctiveness of Agency Theory and Stewardship Theory。The Academy of Management Review，22(3)，611-613。  new window
30.Hadlock, C. J.、Lumer, G. B.(1997)。Compensation, Turnover, and Top Management Incentives: Historical Evidence。The Journal of Business，70(2)，153-187。  new window
31.Henry, L.、Tosi, J. R.、Gomez-Mejia, L. R.(1994)。CEO Compensation Monitoring and Firm Performance。The Academy of Management Journal，37(4)，1002-1016。  new window
32.Kerr, J. L.、Leslie, Kren(1992)。Effect of relative decision monitoring of chief executive compensation。The Academy of Management Journal，35(2)，370-397。  new window
33.Kren, L.、Kerr, J. L.(1997)。The Effects of Outside Directors and Board Shareholdings on the Relation Between Chief Executive Compensation and Firm Performance。Accounting and Business Research，27(4)，297-309。  new window
34.Litz, R.(1995)。The Family Business: Toward Definitional Clarity。The Academy of Management Journal，100-104。  new window
學位論文
1.辜秋屏(1997)。高階主管酬勞與公司經營績效之實證研究(碩士論文)。國立台灣大學。  延伸查詢new window
2.陳金鈴(1997)。臺灣上市公司股權結構之研究分析(碩士論文)。國立成功大學，臺南。  延伸查詢new window
3.蕭黎明(1993)。臺灣上市公司最高主管之報償、持股比例與公司績效之關係研究(碩士論文)。國立台灣大學。  延伸查詢new window
4.黃旭輝(1997)。公司成長機會對經理人持股、報償與董事監察人組成影響之研究(博士論文)。國立政治大學。new window  延伸查詢new window
5.鄭為庠(1992)。高階主管薪酬計畫與薪酬決定因素之研究(碩士論文)。國立政治大學。  延伸查詢new window
6.磨大偉(1994)。家族企業組織類型、組織結構特徵與組織現象關係之研究，沒有紀錄。  延伸查詢new window
圖書
1.Core, J. E.、Holthausen, R. W.、Larcker, D. F.(1997)。Conference of Executive Compensation and Shareholder Value: Theory and Evidence。Conference of Executive Compensation and Shareholder Value: Theory and Evidence。沒有紀錄。  new window
其他
1.Conyon, M. J.，Peck, S. I.(1996)。Board control, remuneration committees and directors' compensation，England。  new window
圖書論文
1.黃光國(1990)。中國式家族企業的現代化。中國人的權力遊戲。臺北：巨流圖書公司。  延伸查詢new window
 
 
 
 
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