Alexander M. Bickel於六十年代提出司法審查面臨「抗多數困境」的觀點，而在美國憲法學界聲名大噪，隨後並主張司法消極主義的審查理論，這些論點在這半世紀以來也一直受到高度重視。儘管如此，其理論的缺陷是不容否認的，尤其當對照於另一位當代美國重要憲法理論學者R. Dworkin的主張時，似乎更顯而易見。本文擬從簡介Bickel對司法審查的基本觀點與主張出發，繼而透過Dworkin的理論角度，檢視Bickel主張的根本缺陷。本文試圖說明，何以兩人都認為司法審查的基本價值應奠基於「主張原則論證」之上，但對於司法審查在權力分立架構下所應扮演的角色，卻有南轅北轍的見解。從這個分析過程中，本文期能清楚地說明Bickel理論為何面臨困境的根本原因。

Alexander M. Bickel is famous for his theory of judicial review, which is based on the observation that judicial power is destined to be confronted with a so-called “countermajoritarian difficulty.” Numerous discussions based on this observation have demonstrated the importance and influence of Bickel’s argument. Nevertheless, the “resolution” his theory provides seems to be far from satisfactory, especially from Ronald Dworkin’s perspective. This article thus aims to examine Bickel’s theory of judicial review in light of Dworkin’s constitutional theory. From the perspective of Dworkin’s “law as integrity,” the contradiction in Bickel’s argument results mainly from his ignorance or misunderstanding of the true meaning of principles, community, and integrity. This misunderstanding leads to a focus on the protection of majoritarian democracy, which undercuts his initial argument for the defense of “principle” or of certain enduring values. Moreover, by advancing the “majoritarian premise,” it even makes his notion of a countermajoritarian difficulty problematic. In Dworkin’s view, judicial review is in essence compatible with democracy under law as integrity, since both the principle and the safeguarding of its values are important.