John Rawls puts forward a systematic interpretation of Kant’s doctrine expounded in the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals about the moral law. According to Rawls, a “Categorical Imperative” (or CI-) procedure can be constructed on the basis of the Formula of the Universal Law (or FUL), and it is such a procedure that Kant appeals to in an effort to represent the moral law. The chief aim of this paper is to offer a critical exposition of the CI-procedure as interpreted by Rawls. After sketching major elements of Rawls's account, 1 will try to advance some criticisms that center around what he calls “legislative intention” involved in the CI-procedure. Rawls has adopted a traditional line of interpreting Kant which takes his doctrine expounded in the Groundwork about the moral law to stand or fall with whether or not the FUL can be used to generate a set of practical principles that are to regulate the social world. 1 will take issue with this traditional approach by arguing that if the CI-procedure is to be taken as involving “legislative intention,” it will have to appeal to features derived from formulas other than the FUL (especially from the Formula of the Kingdom of Ends), and that if,的 insisted by Rawls, the CI-procedure is to be a legislative procedure resting solely on the FUL, then Kant will be faced with theoretical difficulties which are avoidable if the procedure is interpreted differently. The present paper a attempts to draw due attention to Kant's own account of the three formulas of the Categorical Imperative as representing the moral law.