人權自二戰以來被許多人認為是國際政治、全球事務的規範。一般認為，人權是獨立於個別社會之體制與歷史文化並且是由道德原則所證立的規範。不過，在多元卻又合理的全球政治秩序裡，以某特定道德觀點來理解人權規範，這並非妥當，當然也無法說明人權之普遍有效性。在這篇論文中，我主張，羅爾斯對於人權提出一個不同於一般之理解的說法，稱之為「人權的政治理解」。人權之政治理解不同於一般理解在於，它並不預設特定的道德或宗教這樣的全面性理論，且承認全球合理秩序中的政治多元主義與價值多元主義。人權的政治理解似乎能說明人權之普遍有效性。然而，我也說明，羅爾斯的人權主張有重大不足之處，並嘗試提出補救之道。我試圖說明，「人作為規範性根源」的概念如何可以補救羅爾斯的缺失。

Human rights norm has been widely regarded as regulative for international politics and global affairs sint the World War II. According to the standard understanding, human rights are valid independently of any social institution and practice and are justified by some moral principles. However, in a reasonable, pluralistic world, it is inappropriate to understand human rights from a particular moral point of view, which is particularistic and has great difficulties in explaining the universality of human rights. In this paper, I argue that the notion of human rights John Rawls proposes is different from the standard, morality-based conception of human rights, which I call it “a political conception of human rights.” The political conception of human rights does not presuppose any comprehensive moral or religious doctrine in explaining human rights. It also recognizes the reasonableness of political and value pluralism in a reasonable global order. So the political conception seems able to give an adequate account of the universality of human rights. However, as I shall argue, Rawls’s account of the political conception of human rights has serious defects. I attempt to rescue the political conception by proposing a universal understanding of human individuals, which is needed but absent in Rawls’s theory of human rights.