我國公司法師承大陸法系，對於關乎債權人權利保障重屬重要之資本維持原則設有相關專責規定，然而對應資本消極使用層面，現行公司法僅於第二三三條及第一六七條設有原則性之規定，但是詳觀其內容，對於法律關係當事人間之行為內容，包含主觀要件及客觀要件等，均屬簡要；復以其規範體系不一致(如公司法第九條、第一六七條、第二三三條就違法取回出資責任、違法收回自己股份及違法分配盈餘兼採刑事及民事責任，但是與其性質或行為方式相似之第十五、十六條則採取單純民事責任)，則其區分適用之標準及論理邏輯之間之關係如何，以及其對公司債權人權利之保護會發生何種之影響，於現行實務及學界研究均甚缺乏，本文乃以此為研究意識，回歸資本維持原則之發展始祖，即德國股份法以及有限公司法之規範加以闡述。 　　研究顯示，德國法系關於資本維持原則之規範態度之論述，具有如下幾個特徵：(一)、就資本維持之客體方面：於有限公司法第三十條係採取純粹以實收資本(Stammkatipal )為中心之思考，於股份法則是採取較大範圍之資本保護，其範圍除實收資本外，尚及於依商法應提列之資本公積、法定盈餘公積以及由股東會任意提列之特別盈餘公積。此二者所呈現之功能區分主要是著眼於公司組織架構之不同；(二)、就資本維持之概念而言：其所強調者係防止上開資本標的因公司負責人之違法或不當行為而使其發生不正常之負面減損，從而立法者利用「禁止違法取回出資」之抽象不確定法律概念以為規範，而司法實務及學說則透過實質觀察法或經濟觀察法，發展出「隱藏性盈餘分配」或「隱藏性取回出資」等等觀念，並據以導引出諸多適用類型(Fallgruppe)以為未來相關案件適用時之準據。由以上觀點可之，德國法系之資本維持原則，於法學方法上，是一種站在「目的論」取向下的規範制度。就此股份法及有限公司法基於資本維持原則之禁止法功能所引申出對於債權人保障之體系，亦不相同，其對應不同類型之公司屬性所為之立法，誠屬周延。 　　我國現行公司法於第九條、第二三三條之規定，經本文審查結果，認為其具有相當之資本維持原則之特徵，茲引用有關前述德國法之研究成果與上開條文進行對照與討論，希能對於上開條文於我國學界及實務運用時參考之依據。

　　The legal capital system invented in 1882 Germany Merchant Law and Germany Limited Liability Company law regards the protection of the coporation creditors superior to the interests of the shareholders as the central concept of the capital-based corporate governance model. Among the principles firmly defended by scholars and court precedents, the capital maintenance rule is always held to be most capable of achieving the goal mentioned above. The article arranges the test methods developed by scholars for the capital maintenance rule as follows: (1) the subscribed capital as the observed basis; (2) the shareholders generally cannot take back the afforded contributions unless otherwise statuted; (3) the corporation principally cannot acquire its own shares, either itself or through a person acting in his own name but on the company’s behalf, as treasury stock unless otherwise statuted; (4) the coporation is prohibited to pay the interests for shareholders’ contribution; (5) the shareholders are restricted to only have the right for dividends before the corporation liquidation. Via reviewing the test methods shall we find that the protection function of this rule firstly demands the shareholders return the payment from the corporation if it is deemed to impair the structure of the subscribed capital. On the contrary, if the payment is distribution, any of it must principally be returned by shareholders who have received it when the company proves that these shareholders knew of the irregularity of the distributions made to them, or could not in view of the circumstances have been unaware of it. 　　Secondly the rule gives the corporation creditors the direct claims to sue for the shareholders only when the subscribed capital has been unable to be maintained to harm the rights of the coporation creditors. 　　According to the Germany copoaration law, the author of this article thinks that many fatal problems implicating the non at arm’s length transaction between the aware shareholders and corporation injuring the capital structure of corporation and the benefits of other shareholders and creditors in Anglo-American law can absolutely be covered under the core concept of capital maintenance rule to give the better protection for corporation creditors.