「以德報怨」原本只是日本新聞媒體對蔣介石所發表的〈抗戰勝利告全國軍民及世界人士書〉之解讀，卻因貼切形容蔣寬大對日之理念，遂演變成戰後國民政府對日政策的綜合名稱。而其實際內涵還包括蔣介石對日本天皇制的維護、反對分割日本、善待日本在華居民等具體措施。至於放棄戰爭賠償，並非蔣介石初衷。蓋自開羅會議時，蔣介石就主張日本應以工業設備、軍事物資來賠償中國。戰後，國民政府在遠東委員會的運作下，也開始執行了部份日本工廠的拆遷，以作為戰爭賠償。爾後由於中國大陸赤化，主客觀情勢的逆轉，才是國民政府在1952年與日本政府簽訂《中日和平條約》時，主動放棄戰爭索賠的原因。也就是說，中國大陸的赤化，改變了美國的對日政策，也破壞了國民政府向日本政府求償的基本立場。前者是指美國對日政策從早期要求日本以實物賠償，到後期改為不准列強向日本要求賠償，只容許亞洲國家向日本要求提供象徵性的勞役服務。此一政策的轉移，已嚴格限制中國向日本求償的空間。後者是指國民政府治權不及大陸，連要求日本提供象徵性勞役服務的基本立場，亦已喪失。 戰後的蔣介石之所以對日本寬大為懷，是因為他自始就不以日本國民為敵，反而認為中日兩國本為兄弟之邦，只要窮兵黷武的日本軍閥一滅，中日兩國絕對可以化敵為友。再者，戰後的中國可居亞洲領導地位，日本必會主動來歸，特別是兩國在戰前就是以反共為國策，戰後更應在反共的前提下合作無間。這也是戰爭末期，美國仍未認清國際共黨勢力的威脅，主張對日施以嚴懲，蔣介石卻力持寬大政策，並戮力於維護天皇制以及日本領土完整的緣由所在。 除了維護天皇制以及日本領土完整，是著眼於抗衡蘇聯的遠期目標以外，蔣介石還有立即需要和日本合作的近期計畫。戰後的受降就是一明顯實例。對國民政府而言，戰後的受降是另一種形式的保衛戰，成敗攸關國民政府政權的安危，且其進行的順利與否，不僅關乎國共兩黨勢力之消長，亦涉及到今後與友邦之間的外交關係。《中蘇友好同盟條約》的簽訂，雖然以犧牲外蒙古與旅順為條件，換取到蘇聯的不支持中共、不染指東北及新疆等三大保證，可是蘇聯是否會遵守條約，還端視國民政府是否仍能主導中國政局而定。此外，美國雖然是大戰期間國民政府的最重要盟邦，但卻熱中推動國共和談，對國民政府的軍事剿共政策持否定態度。在這種內憂外患的情勢之下，受降問題自然就成為國民政府只許成功不許失敗的背水一戰。 抗戰勝利前夕，國民政府軍主力遠在西南、西北，日軍卻集中在華北、華東，國民政府軍要受降，調動需時。相較之下，共軍因在淪陷區發展，與日軍防區本是比鄰，在受降上顯然有地利之便。換言之，蔣介石的挑戰，就是如何動員日軍在國民政府軍接防前，代為捍衛防區。保留日軍原有的作戰系統，將日軍納入國民政府軍補給體制，使其享有與國民政府軍官兵同等待遇，是蔣介石在戰後動員日軍參與受降保衛戰時所採取的政策。在關內原訂27個重要戰略都市的受降計畫中，除了6個都市為蘇軍進佔以外，其餘21個都市，國民政府皆得以按原訂計畫進行。受降計畫進展順利，日軍的積極配合是一大助力。尤其是華北一地，日軍為了確保鐵路正常運輸，以及戰略軍事物資不落共軍之手，半年內死傷及失蹤人數就高達9,000餘人，凸顯出日軍對蔣的受降計畫之充分配合。蔣的聯日反共政策，也達到一定的效果。國民政府也因得力於關內受降計畫的順利進行，才得以繼續維持國內政局的主導地位。 評論蔣介石「以德報怨」政策的功過得失時，「中國大陸的淪陷」以及「中共的長期執政」所造成的時空背景之驟變，自然也應列入考量。也就是說，蔣介石的原本期許，不能說是全然落空，天皇制的維持，日本領土的完整，皆為戰後日本的復興奠下良好基礎。復興後的日本，的確也一度成為太平洋地區對抗國際共黨勢力的中心基地。只是中國大陸的淪陷，首先讓蔣介石以中國為中心的亞洲領導體制破產；其次是中共的長期執政，終讓日本政府於1972年決定棄中華民國政府，而改與中共建立正式外交關係。

　　　　　The policy of magnanimity toward Japan after World War II, a strategic political gesture, largely reflected Chiang Kai-shek's hope of reconciliation with the Japanese in the post-war era. Its practical measures included maintaining the emperor-system, not dismembering Japan, and quickly repatriating prisoners of war; however, Chiang did not initially consider canceling war reparations. In other words, since the Cairo conference Chiang had demanded that Japan should pay China reparations in industrial equipment and military goods. During the post-war era, the Nationalist government, through the Far Eastern Commission, began the removal of some Japanese factories for reparations. However, the situation then changed with the Communist takeover of mainland China, and the Nationalist government agreed to give up its reparation claims, which was acknowledged in the peace treaty signed in 1952. It was also the 1949 Communist revolution in China that changed the policy of the United States toward Japan and destroyed the chances of the Nationalist government to seek reparations. Originally, the U. S. had supported reparations, but later it disallowed any of the powers from seeking reparations. The only exception was for other Asian countries to demand symbolic labor service. This definitely destroyed the possibility for the Nationalist government to demand war reparations, and since the mainland was lost to the Communists, it could not even demand symbolic labor service. Chiang Kai-shek also forgave a defeated Japan all its war crimes because of his belief that the Japanese people had not been China's enemies. He believed that China and Japan were fundamentally as close as brothers, and as soon as Japanese militarism perished, Sino-Japanese relations could return to friendship. As well, if a post-war China led Asia in the future, Japan would surely follow, letting bygones be bygones. Chiang thus not only wanted China to decline to take revenge after the war, but also to help Japan rebuild. In Chiang's view, post-war Sino-Japanese relations could not only move from hostility to friendship, but also the Japanese would follow the lead of China. Prior to the war, both nations shared anti-communist policies, and in the post-war period anti-communism should become an even more powerful glue. In the latter years of the war, before the U. S. had recognized the international communist threat and still advocated strict punishment of Japan, Chiang was determined to follow a policy of magnanimity toward Japan and support the maintenance of the emperor-system and Japan's territorial integrity. In addition to support for the emperor-system and Japan's territorial integrity as part of a long-term plan to deal with the Soviet Union, Chiang also had a more immediate need to cooperate with Japan. The clearest case was the issue of postwar surrender, which for the Nationalist government was another battle to defend its sovereignty over mainland China. In terms of the political crisis facing the Nationalists, success in receiving Japan's surrender would not only help it against the Communists but also in its later relations with other nations. At the cost of Outer Mongolia and Port Arthur, the treaty of friendship and alliance with USSR committed the Soviet Union not to support the Communists against the Nationalist government and not to intervene on China's northeastern border or in Sinkiang (Xinjiang). However, the Soviet Union would fulfill its treaty obligations only if the Nationalist government could stabilize its authority over mainland China. On the other hand, the U. S., although the Nationalists' most important ally during the war, strongly supported peace talks between the GMD and the CCP and opposed the Nationalists' policy of fighting the Communists. Facing these internal and external pressures, the Nationalists absolutely had to receive Japan's surrender in order to maintain any semblance of power. On the eve of Japan's surrender, the Nationalist forces were concentrated in southwest and northwest China, and they had to move to the north and northeast to take over the occupied areas-just next to the Communist-controlled areas. This obviously gave the Communists a geographical advantage in moving in on the Japanese areas, and so the challenge facing Chiang was how to mobilize the Japanese troops to hold out until the Nationalists could arrive. Chiang's strategy was to maintain the existing Japanese military system, to share supplies with them, and to offer them the same levels of treatment as the Nationalist army. With Japanese cooperation, the Nationalists thus regained control of 21 of 27 strategic cities, while six were occupied by the USSR. This high degree of cooperation with the Japanese army was the key to the Nationalists' takeover of the occupied territories. Especially in North China, in securing railway transportation and military supplies, the Japanese army lost at least 9,000 soldiers within half a year (including the wounded and missing)-evidence of the high degree of Japanese military coordination with Chiang. The policy of allying with Japan against the Communists thus came to fruition, allowing the Nationalist government to smoothly reassert its leadership over China. Therefore, any evaluation of the merits and problems of Chiang Kai-shek's magnanimity policy should take into account the rapidly changing historical situation: the "fall of the mainland" to the Communists and their extended period of rule. In other words, Chiang's original expectations were not entirely unmet, for policies like support for the emperor-system and Japan's territorial integrity were all helpful to its post-war reconstruction. The restored Japan did become the Pacific's central base of resistance to international communism. However, with the loss of the mainland to the Communists, which destroyed Chiang's hopes that China would become the leading country in Asia, and with the Communists' successful maintenance of power, the Japanese government broke off formal diplomatic relations with the Nationalist government and established them with Communist China in 1972.