這篇長文是拙著《純粹力動現象學》（台灣商務印書館，排印中）中挺重要的一章，旨在把胡塞爾的超越現象學與筆者的純粹力動現象學匯集在一起，作一義理上的比較，集中在雙方的異同分際上。先說同的一面。首先，兩個體系都是現象學而不是現象論。後者是對現象的純然的描述，缺乏價值義的導向。現象學則是以價值的語言，對現象作全盤的探討，而聚焦在一個具有理想主義導向的現象世界的建立。第二，超越現象學與純粹力動現象學都有一種統合現象與物自身或本體兩界的意向，在存有論上讓兩界通而為一，克服西方傳統形上學的現象與物自身或本體（實體）的分離的理論困難。第三，兩種現象學都立根於觀念論，以動感性的觀念作為一切存在的根源。第四，在認識論方面，兩種現象學都要在第一義諦與世俗諦相即不離的關係下同時對現象與物自身或本體建立客觀有效的知識。 在異的一面，第一，超越現象學的挺重要的超越自我觀念，被視為由多束意識流所組合而成，因而難以建立自我同一性。在純粹力動現象學，超越自我即是作為終極原理的純粹力動表現在主體方面的睿智的直覺，它是一個整一的主體，其同一性是很自然的。第二，在事物的成立方面，胡塞爾透過意識所具的意向性以意指對象，同時也構架對象。但對象或事物是具體的、立體的，意識則是抽象的。抽象的意識如何能成就具體的、立體的事物呢？這需要一宇宙論的推演。胡塞爾在這方面沒有措意。依純粹力動現象學，純粹力動透過凝聚、下墮、分化，最後詐現為具體的、立體的事物，這詐現是一宇宙論的觀念。

This is an important chapter taken from the author's book The Phenomenology of Pure Vitality to be published. It presents a comprehensive comparison between Husserl's transcendental phenomenology and the author's phenomenology of pure vitality. With regard to the similarities, first, both systems pertain to phenomenology rather than phenomenalism. Phenomenalism is descriptive in nature, whereas phenomenology is axiological, providing an ideal for one to seek. Secondly, both systems aim at the unification of phenomena and noumena, and therby overcome the difficulty of separation of these two worlds which has perplexed Western metaphysics since Plato. Thirdly, both systems assume the standpoint of idealism, taking the dynamic idea or consciousness as an ontological ground. Fourthly, in epistemological terms, both systems aim at the establishment of objective knowledge in the context of the non-separation of ultimate truth and conventional truth. As for contrasts, it is manifest that Husserl's pivotal concept, the transcendental self, cannot maintain self-identity, in view of that it is formed by the composition of various branches of consciousness. In the phenomenology of pure vitality, however, the true self, which is indeed an intellectual intuition, is the direct manifestation of the pure vitality as the ultimat principle. This intellectual intuition is nothing but a unified and identificated subjectivity. Another point is that Husserl holds that physical entities are pointed to by the intentionality and constructed by the conscionsness, to which the intentionality pertains. How can the consciousness,abstract and ultimate in nature, construct or develop into the concrete and cubic entities? The solution is, no doubt, an cosmological deduction, which accounts for the formation of those entities from the consciousness. This cosmological deduction is unfortunately lacking in Husserl's system. Consequently, the construction of entities from the conscionsness as maintained by Husserl is untenable. In the phenomenology of pure vitality, the pure vitality undergoes condensation, degradation, differentiation, finally manifesting itself through assuming various forms of entity. This is what is called “pratibhasa” in Buddhism, meaning taking the concrete and cubic shape conventionally. The function of this pratibhasa is cosmological in nature.