本文探討西方哲學思想中靈魂概念之根本問題，第一部分特別強調亞里斯多德暨多瑪斯傳統中對靈魂解釋的四個關鍵奠基命題，即：現實與潛能、質料與形式、亞里斯多德四個面向的因果觀、以及目的論的宇宙。筆者接著藉從目的因與徵成因的揚棄，解釋亞里斯多德暨多瑪斯傳統的衰落，這是西方思想買威廉．奧坎開始到笛卡落達高峰所生的意義重大之事件。第二部份筆者討論西方哲學對靈魂的念以及對笛卡爾二元論的揚棄，此揚棄標示出心靈學的理智歷程，雖努力解決身心問題，卻完全失去對傳統靈魂觀探討之報與步驟。在這脈終裡，筆者簡單點出約翰．塞爾的作品對意識問題的看法。第三部份探討亞里斯多德暨多瑪斯對靈魂的看法有更詳盡的說明，特別是其五大核心(但亦被誤解)的特徵：人的靈魂是身體的實體形式、不是加諸在身體之上的，具智性與非物質性，自身並非完全的實體，以及靈魂與身體的結合對人的實體真相有建設性。在結論部份思索問題為：當代科學能否與亞里斯多德暨多瑪斯對話？筆皷的答案是佑設科學願意接受非物質因的可能性，並且重評估形式因的概念就可行。筆者進一步的結論是接受亞里斯多德以存有論組成的形質說，產生一種可能：既能支持精神實在論及反化約主義，同時又能避免落入實體二元論與屬性二元論，總之要排除物質一元論。

In this article, I explore the philosophical itinerary of the notion of ‘soul’ in western philosophy. Part I places special emphasis on the Aristotelian-Thomistic account of soul, explaining it in light of four key background issues: ‘act and potency’, ‘matter and form’, Aristotelian four-dimensional causality, and the teleological ‘cosmos’. I then explain the demise of the Aristotelian-Thomistic account occasioned by the rejection of the notions of final and formal causality, and intellectual event of paramount significance in western thought originating in William of Ockham and culminating in René Descartes. In part II, I consider mainstream western philosophy’s abandonment of the notion of ‘soul’ altogether along with Cartesian dualism, and how this abandonment marked the intellectual itinerary of the philosophy of mind which would endeavor to resolve the mindbody problem entirely bereft of anything approaching a classical conception of ‘soul’. In this context, I briefly spotlight the work of John Searle on the problem of consciousness. In part III, I consider the Aristotelian-Thomistic account of the human soul on greater detail, especially five of its central (and most misunderstood) features: the soul as substantial form of the body, as not superimposed on the body; as intellective and incorporeal; as an incomplete substance considered in itself; and the soul-body communion as constitutive of the substantial reality which is the human person. In the conclusion, the substantial reality which is the human person. In the conclusion, I ask whether contemporary science can dialogue with the Aristotelian-Thomistic account of the human soul. I answer that his can only take place if science is willing to countenance the possibility of non-physical causal pathways, and to genuinely re-revaluate the notion of formal causality. I further conclude that endorsement of the Aristotelian hylemorphic conception of ontological composition opens the possibility to sustaining mental realism and anti-reducationism while avoiding commitments to substance dualism or property dualism, all the while rejecting material monism.