倫理實踐的目的就在於過個「好生活」或「美善人生」(good life)。而「幸福」(希：??δαιμ?ν?α, eudaimonia；拉：beatitudo；英：happiness)，亞里斯多德稱之為「世界上最好、最高尚，落且最快樂的東西」，正是那美善人生境界的總括詞；「幸福」由於作為人生的最終目的，因此也必然成為哲學倫理學的核心概念之一。本文藉由多瑪斯對「幸福」的看法：聚焦於倫理行為的主體──「人」，鉅細靡遺地討論「何謂人的幸福？」，首先採取其慣用的「否定式」的方式來排除不屬於幸福之事物；再以分析、辯證的方式正面提出的方式來排除不屬於幸福之事物；再以分析、辯證的方式正面提出可以作為人的幸福之事物，嘗試回應「何謂幸福？」的基源問題。以此作為建構輔仁學派的人生最終目的芻議之一種嘗試。

　　　　　The purpose of ethic practice is to lead a good life. And happiness (??δαιμ?ν?α, eudaimonia in Greek and beatitude in Latin), "the best, the noblest and the most joyful thing in the world" in Aristotle's eyes, is the all-inclusive term of such a life. As the last end of life, "happiness" is inevitably one of the central concepts of philosophical ethics. Through Thomas Aquinas's views about "happiness," which is to focus on the subject of ethical practice-human persons, we discuss in details "what men's/women's happiness is." First, we employ Aquinas's negative methodology to rule out the things that don't qualify as happiness; then we will suggest in an analytical and dialectical way what qualifies as happiness for men/women, in wishes to answer the essential question: "What is happiness?" This can be one of the concepts on which to construct the Fu-Jen School's last end of life.