本文從「公司治理」的觀點探討臺灣基層金融經營管理弊端，並提出改革的政策方案，文中所指基層金融主要是界定在「農漁會信用部」。臺灣農漁會是一多功能、多目標的農漁民團體組織，半世紀以來，農漁會與政府形成了一個獨特「夥伴關係」(partnership)，農漁會甚至代替政府執行許多農業政策，尤其信用部肩負著農漁業金融的角色，提供農漁村地區農漁業生產必要的資金。從1995年始，基層金融犯罪連連，涉案並遭司法機關起訴案共有131人，其中總幹事有35人，信用部主任7人，其他相關人士有89人，由此可見信用部的經營績效與紀律問題極為嚴重。根據財政部2003年底的揭露資料，全國253家農會信用部，逾放比在 50％以上的有6家，其中逾放比超過 40％以上者有14家，尤其有36家的淨值幾乎都已是負數，最後遭銀行承接，顯示著農漁會信用部「經營管理」出現了嚴重的「道德危險」問題。 本文以「公司治理」(corporate govermance)為基礎，探討農漁會信用部經營管理弊端，並提出建立適當「公司治理」的改革思維。農漁會信用部所呈現的超貸、冒貸現象是經濟組織中經營管理者的「道德危險」(moral hazard)行為，也是經濟學者Oliver Williamson所指的經營者的「機會主義」(opportunism)，這些弊端的發生，實與經濟組織所處的「制度」有密切的關係。Williamson 指出 「制度」決定經濟組織的「交易成本」，其提出「三層級圖」(three-level schema)，包含：制度環境(institutional context)、組織治理(organizational govemance)以及經營者個人理性自利行為(rational self-interest)，而交易成本係來自三向互動的結果。 就農漁會信用部而言，「制度環境」因素即是農會法賦予農會的多功能目標、農漁會與政憲及政府關係、農漁會所處地方政治生態等，這些制度環因素影響基層金融監理效能，也成為長期以來政府未能落實基層金融監理的根本原因；此外，組織治理即為農會信用部的「公司治理」問題；而經營管理者個人理性自利與競租(rent-seeking)行為，與農會所處制度環境，及農會內部組織治理具有密切的關係，尤其是「組織治理」更具關鍵。 本文發現，當前臺灣農會信用部經營管理的問題，主要根源於組織內治理制度缺乏有效的內部控制，包括監督、稽核與審議等制度，尤其缺乏資訊揭露等，亦即是農會「公司治理」(corporate govermance)失靈，導致信用部的授信與風險管理機制蕩然無存現象，改革之道即建立屬於基層金融特有的「公司治理」制度，加強理監事之授信監督、審議權力，提升稽核單位位階，與建立正常的會計制度等，最重要的是加強信用部業務資訊透明度。因此政府的金融改革政策應涵蓋「公司治理」的規範，以防止經營者的道德危險。

This paper examines managerial incompetence and inefficiency of local financial system through corporate governance perspective. The scope of financial system to be investigated is defined as Credit Department (CP) of Farmers' Associations in Taiwan (hereafter FAT). FAT and the government have formed a partnership in terms of agricultural policy implementation. Particularly, its Credit Department (CP), as crucial part of local banking, has played significant role of agricultural financing that essentially promote rural development in rural areas in Taiwan. Since 1995, local banking system has been so corrupted. There are 131 persons involved in illegal financing process in local financial institutions. Among of those, 35 convicted persons are general managers, 7 are directors of credit department, and 89 associated with FAT. Obviously, Credit Department has been so corrupted and its operation and internal management have revealed serious problems. According to Ministry of Finance, rate of non-performance loan (NPL) of 6 CPs has exceeded 50%, 14 higher 40%. Particularly net-profit of 36 CPs have been negative, consequently, they were forcedly merged into commercial banks under governmental financial reform authority. All of those institutional and managerial problems have revealed moral hazard generally happened in CPs. This paper based on corporate governance perspective examines operational and managerial problems of CPs and proposed a reform direction derived from corporate governance theoretical argument. This paper points out that operational and managerial inefficiency and moral hazard conducted by managers of FAT are rooted in failure of organizational governance and ineffective internal control, including monitoring, auditing, and accounting, particularly lack of information disclose. In brief, there is no proper institutional building of corporate governance within FAT; as a result, it is short of risk management of loaning. This paper suggests a reform proposal that should build a specific corporate governance that is appropriate to local banking system. It should emphasize monitoring of loaning process, auditing capacity, standard accounting system. Most important is the enforcement of information transparency. Hence, the financial reform implemented by the regulatory agencies should impose corporate governance on financial institutions.