近年來銀行業受景氣衰退影響與新銀行的強烈競爭，導致銀行業的資產品質惡化，尤其是公營銀行於民營化後大幅提列備抵呆帳。但對於放款品質的評量與備抵呆帳提列的多寡，將直接衝擊當期損益。本研究係採盈餘管理觀點，探討商業銀行面對財務預測之落差現象，銀行管理者係以穩健的風險承擔態度提列呆帳費用藉以反映授信風險之變異現象，或是以平穩帳面盈餘為前提下操弄當期備抵呆帳之盈餘管理行為，本研究之目的即為檢測不同屬性之商業銀行，是否存在肇因於可裁決性呆帳提列行為所造成的盈餘管理現象，實為銀行業推動公司治理所必須考量的重要議題之一。實證結果顯示，當樣本為新銀行、股價無論是在淨值以上或於淨值以下的銀行、以及無法達成財測的銀行，會以相對較為穩健的風險承擔態度，面對其授信風險與經濟環境的不確定性，可謂是較不具盈餘管理的現象存在。而能夠達成財測的銀行，則可能藉由可裁決性備抵呆帳的提列來進行盈餘管理，推論原因是當銀行的營運狀況良好時，銀行管理者有較大的空間，在獲利的年度提撥較高的備抵呆帳，以期來年獲利下降時，少提備抵呆帳以平穩盈餘，進而達成符合市場預期之目的。

The loan loss reserve of the commercial bank could qualify and measure the credit risk that bank assume. However, the loan loss reserve may become the tool for the bank manager to manipulate the earnings. The executive of the bank may via the loan loss reserve of the discretionary accruals to give rise to the “earnings management” to undertake congruence of the analysts‘ standpoints of the earnings forecasting. This study analyze the commercial bank with the different attributes, include the old bank and new bank, share price higher than the net worth and lower than net worth, the accounting income can meet the earnings forecasting and can't meet. When the bank whose the accounting income can meet the earnings forecasts, may exist the action of the “earnings management”; reasoning if the operation condition of the bank good, can appropriate more of loan loss reserve, else if future operation not good, then may appropriate less loan loss reserve to conform the expectancies of security market investors.