本文認為為解決或緩和智慧財產權與競爭法的衝突，首先，可採行正確的關鍵設施理論（目前公平會及電信法所採之關鍵設施理論有值得斟酌之處），作為判斷獨占事業是否濫用其獨占地位的有效標準：即獨占地位之行使若欠缺正當理由而排除上下游關聯市場之競爭，應非正常行使市場力量應有的結果，而已達濫用之地步。其次，在既有的公共政策目標之外，可為專利強制授權增加競爭法的考量，即以關鍵設施理論看強制授權，從而檢討專利法第76條第1項後段、第2項及第78條第4項但書規定。本文最後建議強制授權之審定事宜改由公平會負責。

In order to resolve or alleviate the conflict between intellectual property rights and competition law, this paper proposes a two-pronged approach. On the one hand it seeks to introduce the rightfully, i.e. stringently-defined, essential facility doctrine as the yardstick for the determination of whether the dominant or monopolistic undertakings have abused their market power by refusing to grant licenses for the use of their patents. On the other hand, it seems appropriate to infuse competition perspectives into the regime of compulsory licensing patents, which pursues its own public policy goals. In other words, the compulsory licensing of patents is seen through the eyes of the essential facility doctrine, which compulsorily grants licenses for the use of patents if the refusal to grant such licenses by the patentee would exclude competition in the downstream, upstream or adjacent markets. This paper concludes by suggesting that the Fair Trade Commission should be the competent authority to handle the issue of the compulsory licensing of patents in the future.