俄國革命及〈對華宣言〉，引發國內革新、革命思潮及友俄空氣之高漲，知識界首次出現以革命理念或方式，觀察、參與、影響外交之現象。革命與外交為莫斯科東進之雙翼，而革命則服從其外交戰略。中俄交涉仍具「弱國無外交」之意味，一般知識界之對俄態度，因其外交步驟之推進而前後變化，對其主義之信仰熱度亦隨之回落。 　　與此相適應，革命與外交始終是知識界對俄態度之矛盾主線，其間不斷出現分歧、論爭與衝突。在數年中俄交涉中，知識界實際存在兩種既聯繫又鬥爭之勢力：一是基於革命考量之聯俄、「親俄」勢力，一是基於外交考量之抵制蘇俄利己外交、維護國家權益之勢力。兩種勢力此消彼長，大抵在王加草約簽證之前，革命考量居主流地位，此後以國家為本位之外交考量轉為優勢。 　　不同群體對俄之革命與外交考量各有差等。具體而言，中共黨團知識分子、國民黨知識分子、學生界、教育界、一般輿論界對俄態度之革命考量，由前者至後者漸次減弱，而外交考量則由前至後依次遞增。就知識界對俄態度之變化過程而言，一般輿論界、教育界、學生界、國民黨知識分子之右翼，及少數中共黨團或接近中共之知識分子，依次從「親俄」陣營中剝離出去。「親俄」與「聯俄」並不等同，一般知識界之加入對俄外交運動，多鑒於腐敗政府無力應對時局、挽回利權，而非所謂對蘇俄外交之「應和」，更非「親俄」所能為斷。蘇俄對1919-1924年間之中國，整體影響越來越大，然其對華外交卻使知識界中之「親俄」陣營越來越小。

The Russian Revolution and the Karakhan Manifestos promoted the rise of revolutionary thought, and pro-Russian feeling ran high among the Chinese intelligentsia. For the first time the Chinese intelligentsia used revolutionary ideas to observe, participate, and influence the course of Chinese diplomacy. Revolution and diplomacy were the two pillars of Russia's eastward expansion policy, though Sino-Russian negotiations still embraced the notion that “weak countries have no diplomacy.” Ordinary intellectuals' attitudes toward Russia changed with the opening of Russia's actual diplomatic moves; their belief in Bolshevism was weakened accordingly. 　　On the whole, revolution and diplomacy were also the two major themes of the Chinese intelligentsia's attitude toward Russia. A number of divergences, controversies, and conflicts emerged within this context. In the subsequent years of Sino-Russian negotiations, the Chinese intelligentsia formed two camps: one was a pro-Russian camp that considered Russia to be China's revolutionary ally, while the other one resisted Russian foreign policy in order to preserve national sovereignty. Before the March 14, 1924 Secret Protocol, revolutionary sympathies formed the mainstream of Chinese diplomacy, while more purely nationalistic considerations gained the main position afterwards. 　　Every group's attitudes toward the Soviet Union were different. If we rank these groups according to their degree of revolutionary commitment, we can differentiate intellectuals belonging to the Communist Party and the Communist Youth League, Guomindang intellectuals, students, teachers and scholars, and the press. Following down this list, we can see that the degree of practical diplomatic concerns moves from low to high. As for the changing course of the intelligentsia's general attitude toward Russia, the ordinary press, the teachers and scholars, students, the right wing of Guomindang intellectuals, and a few Communists and League members gradually peeled off from the pro-Russian camp. Those people who continued to support the Soviet Union were not always Russophiles. Ordinary intellectuals favored close relations with Russia simply because the Beijing government could not safeguard national sovereignty; since this was their own desire, they should not be regarded as Russophiles. During the years from 1919 to 1924, the Soviet Union's overall influence in China increased rapidly, but its China policy weakened the pro-Russian element among the Chinese intelligentsia, leading to the steady diminution of the pro-Russian camp.