臺灣於2002 年加入世界貿易組織（World Trade Organization ，以下簡稱WTO），依「補貼暨平衡措施協定」規範，過去實施數十餘年的漁業用油優惠政策，因屬於生產投入禁止性補貼，且對海洋資源的永續利用產生不利效果。為避免招致國際控訴影響國家整體利益，並為維護海洋資源永續利用，漁政單位遂採取分階段調降漁業用油優惠標準，於2002 年9 月1 日起優惠標準減半，並將調降用油優惠所結餘之經費，轉至辦理實施獎勵性休漁政策。本研究以數學規劃方法建構臺灣漁業部門均衡模型，藉以評估獎勵性休漁對漁業部門之影響。 對船主而言，符合自願性休漁的條件需一年內累計出海100天以上，且至少120天停船未出港作業，對大部份50噸級以下各漁法別皆已滿足規定。對未符合自願性休漁的條件之漁民若休漁除將負擔漁獲收益下降，且需負擔船員的基本工資，因自願性休漁的獎勵金僅足夠支付0-10噸、10-50噸及50-100噸漁船約平均18天、3天及2天的工資成本，因此在誘因極低之下自願參與休漁意願偏低，指定性休漁才可能有效避免沿近海漁業資源過度捕撈。因此，本文進一步模擬國內若採大陸伏季指定性休漁政策，指定7、8 月禁漁期，推估生產者剩餘變動之補償變量，作為未來漁政單位在維持漁民福利水準不變下，實施指定性休漁獎勵總金額擬定之依據。 實證結果顯示，若2005 年完全取消用油優惠，相對於2002 年入會基期年，沿近海漁業部門所受衝擊最大，產量減少4.04% ，附加價值減少13.20% ，且受限於產業供給縮減時，固定漁船投資僵固性及進口替代效果的影響，因此完全取消用油優惠的影響效果明顯表現在中間投入的增加，相對於2002 年入會模擬基期年，中間投入增加5.87% ，可看出漁民因漁業資源為公共財的特性，競相增加投入造成無謂的損失。若欲有效控制漁獲努力量，因自願性休漁對已符合休漁天數的漁船完全無增加其休漁天數的誘因，指定性休漁相對較自願性休漁有效，依結果顯示指定性休漁較基期年產量及中間投入分別減少8.65% 及9.28% ，其生產者剩餘與2004 年關稅調降並維持漁業用油優惠減半相較下，減少8.23% ，約為減少21 億元生產者剩餘。因此，本研究建議取消用油優惠後，將相當於每年約有37 億元的用油結餘經費轉用到全面性指定性休漁，落實沿近海漁業資源永續利用，以使漁民福利水準維持不變，並維持其基本之生活。

Taiwan had become the 144th member of the WTO since 2002 and had committed to follow the agreement on trade liberalization. Since the fishery fuel tax exemption policy in Taiwan is against the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures under WTO agreement, the fishery sector in Taiwan has faced the impact of eliminating the policy. In addition, in order to conserve the fish resource, the government has implemented a program to reward the fishing vessels which had fulfilled the requirement to fish 100 days at least and had suspended their fishing activities at least 120 days voluntarily started from Sep. 1, 2002 to Aug. 31, 2003. This study utilizes the most current available database in 2002 to specify the fisheries sector partial equilibrium model to evaluate the impact of eliminating fishery fuel tax exemption and the impact of voluntarily suspending fishing activities program. Based on the average wage cost of various tonnage class fishing vessels in 2002, this study shows that the annual rewards of the suspending fishing activities voluntarily are only enough to cover 18 days, 3 days, and 2 days of the fishing activities under 0-10 tons, 10-50 tons, and 50-100 tons, respectively. It is clearly that there is not enough incentive to reduce fishing effort to help the resource to recover. Hence, a mandatory closed fishing season during July and August in Taiwan was proposed by this study and a further simulation was conducted to evaluate the impact on the producer surplus. This study finds that if the fishery fuel tax exemption will be removed in 2005, in contract to the 2002 base year when Taiwan accesses into WTO, the total production and the profit of the coastal and offshore fishing industry decrease by 4.04% and 13.20%, respectively, and the intermediate input cost will increase by 5.87%, which indicates the deadweight loss of fishermen. If the fishing season is closed during July and August, the total production and the total intermediate input of the coastal and offshore fishing industry would decrease by 8.65% and 9.28%, respectively. Since the voluntarily suspending program would not be able to reduce the fishing effort efficiently, especially to most of the fishing vessels which had already fulfill the requirement, it is necessary to enforce a mandatory closed fishing season program. In contract to the current situation that reducing the fuel tax exemption to half, the mandatory closed fishing season program would decrease producer surplus by 8.23% and the amount of compensation is estimated to be about NT$2.1 billion in order to maintain the producer surplus unchanged. This study recommends the government should redirect the NT$3.7 funding that supports for the fishery fuel tax exemption, to compensate fishermen under the mandatory closed fishing season scenario and to achieve the management goal of sustainability of the fishery resource.