現行的環保法規中經常要求廠商需定期申報其環保規定遵行之情況，並依據其產生的污染程度，繳納相關的污染稅款或罰金。是以自動申報制度已成為一項相當廣泛使用的政策工具。其目的主要是希望藉由廠商的自動申報機制，以減輕主管機關的監督與法令執行成本。有關環境污染的自動申報機制，過去文獻雖有相當多的討論，惟一般均屬強制性申報機制，且在不考慮申報成本下進行分析。因此，本研究特將廠商的污染申報成本列為環保政策的一項考慮因素，並運用高、低污染稅率的誘因差異，設計一套自發性申報機制，透過模式推導的方式，分析主管機關的環境稽核政策與廠商的污染防制投入決策及污染申報決策間的交互作用情形，以期獲致可能的政策涵義。

Existing environment regulations frequently require firms to self-report their compliance status to regulatory agencies and then to pay the related taxes depending on their reports. The main purpose of the self-reporting is to reduce necessary supervising and legal enforcement costs via self-reporting regime. Nevertheless, most of the previous literature focuses on some “required” self-reporting regimes regardless of self-reporting costs incurred by firms. Hence, using a principal-agent framework, the paper intends to examine the interaction between the regulator's adult policy with a “spontaneous” self-reporting regime, considering self-reporting cost, and the firm's investment as well as reporting decisions in order to shed light in some policy implications.