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題名:Half-price Purchase Warranties for the Durable Products : A Game Theory Approach
書刊名:管理學報
作者:林亮宏 引用關係王俊賢 引用關係盧淵源 引用關係
作者(外文):Lin, Liang-hungWang, Chun-hsienLu, Iuan-yuan
出版日期:2008
卷期:25:3
頁次:頁381-396
主題關鍵詞:半價保證產品品質賽局理論訊號模式汽車產業Half-price warrantyProduct qualityGame theorySignaling modelAutomobile industry
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
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  • 點閱點閱:26
為了鼓勵消費者駕駛與擁有新的汽車,一些汽車廠商為了保有市場占有率,提供一系列保證策略與方案來刺激消費者對新車之購買意願。例如福特公司設計"紅地毯專案"即提供與滿足消費在購買新汽車時之需求。紅地毯專案主要之工具是當消費者購買新汽車後第三年有三種選擇;首先是退回新車並貸另一臺新車,其次是以原先新車設定之價格繼續保有此新汽,最後是退回此汽車並結束交易。紅地毯專案提供消費者在契約期間終止時根據上述三種方案做出最正確之選擇。換句話說,福特公司之紅地毯專案類似於半價購買保證方法,允許消費者在購買新車時只支付售價的一半,即可擁有該新車。紅地毯專案提供消費者負擔得起與彈性的選擇來滿足所有消費者。 在競爭的汽車産業市場,許多廠商提供半價購買保證做為産品品質保證。相當少的文章利用賽局理論來探討耐久産品如新車之保證效果,因此考慮半價購買保證在耐久産品的設定是相當重要的。然而,上述半價保證範圍有助於提昇消費者對於産品之信念與改善不確定性。針對耐久産品,本研究揭露資訊與最佳化半價購買保證在訊息模式與未知産品品質與風險中立消費者之角色。 本研究有幾項重要發現,本研究強調需發展一個模式來確認廠商所面對資訊與誘因問題。本研究也發現風險中立這消費者,對於耐久産品之半價購習保證僅僅是一個訊息模式而非預防措施。另一方面,在完全訊息之下,無論是否提供半價購買保證措施,消費者體察耐久産品之品質而將持續擁有此産品品質直到其使用壽命終了。此外,若且為若當廠商提供半價購買保證時消費者對於耐久産品品質好壞並不瞭解。廠商發現提供半價購買保證可以增加均衡利潤與均量;最後,結全半價購買保證與産品品價格可清楚發現耐久産品之品質。
Many vehicle dealers have recently begun to offer "half-price purchase warranties". However, the extent to which the above-mentioned warranties raise consumer faith in the underlying products and improve the desire to consume remains uncertain. Focusing on durable products, this investigation examines the informational role and optimality of half-price purchase warranties in a signaling model with unknown product quality and risk-neutral consumers. Our analysis obtained a number of interesting results On the one hand, consumers realizing durable product quality will buy and hold their products until end of service life under complete information whether firms provide half-price warranties policy or not. On the other hand, consumers having no idea on durable product quality will purchase if and only if firms offer a half-price purchase warranty. Firms are found to be willing to offer half-price purchase warranties to increase equilibrium profits and equilibrium quantity. Finally, the combination of half-price purchase warranties and price are found to clearly indicate the quality of durable products.
期刊論文
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