非常弔詭的，女性主義身體觀從柔性身體或是身體習性分析中達成其政治宣告，取消了抽象的主體性傳統，代之以身體體現（embodiment）的優先性。但是，其體現的政治分析呈現的是身體如何被紀律化、正常化和溫馴化的現代化過程，或是在社會場域日常生活中耳濡目染所累積的身體技能與實踐。柔順和習慣的身體不是能動的主體，只是更經久不衰的依附並鞏固了既存的父權結構。可見，如果女性主義身體觀仍然循著傅科和布爾迪厄身體觀的路線，那麼勢必得面對根本的難題：柔順的身體要如何抵抗？習慣的身體要如何更新？抵抗與更新不需要假設主體性嗎？如何才能貫徹女性主義要取消抽象的主體性，同時又可以身體行動為施為者（agency）的核心，得以進行相關的政治運動，從而抵抗既有權力關係，帶動社會改變？ 本文的中心議題將試圖解決女性主義身體觀所面臨的理論與實踐的困境。受限於篇幅，本文僅將焦點放在瑪芮（LoisMcNay, 1999; 2000）和巴特勒（Judith Butler, 1993; 1997）所分別代表的女性主義身體觀。McNay和Butler身體觀的對比就不僅僅只是反映了各自對布爾迪厄（Pierre Bourdieu）和傅科（Michel Foucault）身體觀的理論偏好，還進而凸顯了兩者從性別角度來修正身體觀的見解，從而對女性主義身體政治的發展，有所貢獻。兩相比較，誰的身體政治觀點可以貫徹女性主義要取消抽象的主體性，同時又能以身體為施為（agency）的核心？哪一種女性身體觀，才能抵抗既有權力關係，帶動社會改變？是二擇一的單選題？還是複選題？ 本文的結論是：McNay和Butler身體政治的對比，並非非此即彼的單選題，而是發掘兩者身體觀理論與實踐的互補性與互見性，McNay/Bourdieu偏好社會習性與場域的物質結構面向，因而必須要進一步探討如何從結構中產生對文化主流的衝突與改變；另一個方面，Butler/Foucault偏重於主體化的意義與其相關符碼，因而必須要進一步探討意義結構底層的物質基礎。可見，兼顧意義結構與物質結構對身分認同的關鍵作用，才不會淪於決定論與意志自由兩端，身體政治必須從分析女性如何在規訓中產生抵抗，在被社會收編中獲得其自主性，超越宰制與服從的簡單二元性。以上兼容並蓄的理論特點，表現了女性主義身體觀意圖貫徹女性主義企圖取消抽象的主體性，同時以身體為施為者的核心，得以建立有效的身體政治實踐的相關經驗研究的基本方法與策略。

Both Foucault's analysis of the docile body and Bourdieu's concept of habitus play crucial roles in the social construction of the gendered body held by many feminist theorists such as,to name just a few, S. Bartky, S. Bordo, M. Gatens, J. Butlerand L.McNay. Although not so similar deep down, these feminists share the core idea that body is not given, nor is it everlastingly fixed; instead, body is made, shaped, disciplined and enabled by a set of social (political) relations. However, given the consensus view of body as socially constructed, these feminists disagree at the views about how body resists, revolts, and liberates. The departed routes, to my understanding, reflect the separate theoretical influences of Foucault and Bourdieu on feminists' body politics. Feminists, who highly influenced by Foucault, incline to take gendered body resistance to be a viable political movement through Foucault's analysis of the technology of the self. By contrast, feminists under the influence of Bourdieu, who shows how women's habitus as a result of the unconscious fit between the dominated and the dominant, are pessimistic about the viability of body resistance. Important questions need to be addressed with regard to the different strategies of the body resistance. Why is the social construction of the body useful for body resistance? As far as gender is concerned, is it not the case that women's body is only too docile to negotiate to their advantage? How can women's docile and habitual body turn their weakness into great advantage? If social construction of the body leads to accessible body politics, why would it lead to different crossroads for feminists? Body politics? Which route to take? Is there an alternative to the options now available? The paper will discuss the debate between McNay and Butler on the body for the sake of making clear distinction between two modes of social construction of the body. The elaboration of the contrast serves three purposes directly related to the thesis of this paper, namely, both views on the social construction of body can be complemented and incorporated into a consistent whole. First, the contrast between McNay and Butler reflects distinctive theoretical influences, i.e., McNay's Bourdieu's concept of habitus vs. Butler's Foucault's perspective. Second, although greatly influenced by their theoretical mentors, both McNay and Butler challenge their mentors' theoretical inconsistencies by taking gender identity into account; in thus doing, both contribute to the new alternatives to the feminist body politics. Third, both modes of body politics can be complemented by putting the forces of performative resignifications of the abjected within the specific material contexts of bodily habitus and social fields, in order to go beyond the dichotomy of freedom and determinism, and to bring out how bodily habitus negotiate its way within the social constraints to its own advantage, and in thus doing, to its limited freedom. The body that has been socially constructed,的1 will demonstrate, has limited freedom within social constraints. The embodied resistance, to my conclusion, invokes neither the abstract notion of the subject, nor any room for social determinism.